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Introduction and Executive Summary 
 
 
Investment climate reform, designed to unleash the private sector as an engine of economic 
growth, is a key component of poverty reduction and economic reform strategies. This entails 
providing a sound legal and regulatory framework that encourages investment and business 
development, and strengthening the capacity of government to respond efficiently to enterprise 
needs. In transition economies, structural reforms are necessary, but so is the simple elimination 
of red tape caused by cumbersome and outdated laws and administrative procedures. While 
several useful tools are available to diagnose these problems and recommend solutions, 
implementation is left to the respective government, the primary interlocutor of the international 
community. This top-down strategy can work well where the government has necessary reserves 
of political will and sufficient capacity and maintains a healthy dialogue with the private sector. In 
the absence of these conditions, however, opportunities are lost and strategy papers go 
unimplemented. The result is not only a failure to reform, but also further disillusionment and 
disengagement of the key stakeholders – the citizen entrepreneurs.  
 
This note examines the Bulldozer Initiative in Bosnia and Herzegovina, an innovative reform 
methodology that successfully overcame the lack of political will and capacity at the government 
level through a bottom-up approach. Using an innovative grassroots and public awareness 
methodology, the initiative mobilized the local business community to bulldoze barriers by 
identifying concrete legislative changes and advocating for their adoption and implementation. By 
delivering fast results  – 50 reforms in 150 days  -- the initiative won the confidence of 
entrepreneurs and empowered them to institutionalize permanent grassroots reform committees. 
The force of this lobby group created political will by putting public pressure on the politicians to 
do their part to enact the reforms. Most importantly, it carried investment climate reform the last 
mile by delivering concrete, quantifiable results in all sectors of the economy. Over time, the 
initiative is establishing a dynamic of reform and public-private partnership that will facilitate the 
tackling of more complicated structural reforms. 
 
While the Bulldozer Initiative is to some extent unique because of its context, other public/private 
advisory mechanisms have also been initiated across the world for decades. When targeted at 
improving the investment climate through concrete recommendations that enlist citizens in a 
country-wide or sector-wide movement, their intent and process are very closely related to those 
of the Bulldozer Initiative. Giving concrete examples, the later part of this note describes such 
approaches as Competitiveness Partnerships. Complementing the systemic approach and 
framework reform efforts of governments and international agencies, Competitiveness 
Partnerships mobilize the local business community to catalog concrete problems across the full 
spectrum of investment climate concerns, pinpoint solutions, campaign for their adoption and 
follow up on reform implementation. In conclusion, this note attempts to determine the 
applicability of Competitiveness Partnerships to different settings by modeling the interactions 
between several key success factors, thus providing a pertinent tool for development 
professionals, government officials and private sector advocates who wish to establish a renewed 
implementation dynamic through this kind of results-oriented reform process.    
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Table 1: BiH Economy 
 
  2000  2001  2002 
GNI, Atlas method 
(current US$) 
4.3 billion  5.1 billion  5.2 billion 
GNI per capita, Atlas 
method (current US$) 
1,150  1,270  1,270 
GDP (current $)  4.3 billion  4.8 billion  5.2 billion 
GDP growth  
(annual %) 
15.6  4.5  3.9 
 
Source: World Development Indicators database, August 2003 
 
1- Political and economic context 
 
The result of a political compromise to end a terrible war, Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) has 
been on a kind of international community life support. Since 1995, more than 5 billion USD of 
assistance has poured in, primarily to rebuild destroyed infrastructure and the homes of hundreds 
of thousands of refugees and displaced people. With much of the post-war reconstruction work 
complete, the focus is now on rebuilding the economy. 
 
1a- Political environment 
 
Bosnia’s economic recovery  is burdened by the complex and multi-layered political structure 
created under the Dayton Peace Accords. The political compromise reached in 1995 sought to 
reconcile three peoples living on the same territory: the Bosniaks, who are Muslims; the Serbs, 
who are Orthodox; and the Croats, who are Catholic. It led to the establishment of two Entities 
(the Federation of BiH (FBiH) and the Republika Srpska (RS)), 10 Cantons (all located in the 
Federation) and a semi-independent Brcko District, all loosely connected under a light state 
structure.  
 
This enormous administration is headed by no less than 139 ministers and is supported by public 
expenditure at the excessive level of approximately 60% of GDP. Moreover, it is governed by 14 
legal jurisdictions, which must be harmonized in order to achieve a single economic space. 
Reform efforts face the dual challenge of this cumbersome bureaucracy and the acute political 
sensitivity to change.  
 
In this context, structural reforms are moving extremely slowly, despite strong oversight from the 
Office of the High Representative, mandated to supervise implementation of Dayton’s civilian 
provisions, and endowed by the Peace Implementation Council with the power to impose 
legislation.  
 
1b- Economic indicators  
 
Due in part to strong 
international conditionality, 
BiH has made significant 
progress in achieving macro-
economic stability. On the 
monetary side, the BiH 
Central Bank and Currency 
Board guarantee the most 
stable currency in South 
Eastern Europe, which 
contributed to the near-zero 
inflation rate of 0.2% in 2002. 
Economic stability is reinforced by a treasury system that is running well and sustained by 
budgets that are kept within required limits (under the guidance of very tight constraints set by the 
IMF). The Gross Domestic Product has risen steadily since 1997, and despite unreliable 
statistical data, it is estimated that the GDP growth rate for 2003 reached 5 percent. Even if this is 
a considerable slow-down compared to the 25% average of the post-war reconstruction years 
(1995 – 1997), this rate is now more sustainable and similar to those recorded in neighboring 
countries. 
 
Nonetheless, eight years into peace building, and despite a heavy reconstruction bill and an IC-
led agenda of structural reforms, the economy in Bosnia and Herzegovina is still lagging. With a 
population of 3.5 million, 20% live below the poverty line and another 30% are on or just above it. 
Official unemployment is 40%. GDP per capita is now estimated at around US$1,800, which is 
one of the lowest in Europe.  BiH is burdened with a total debt  - external and internal  - of 
approximately 2.5 billion euros. In 2002, the value of BiH’s exports equaled 25% of its imports.    
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With foreign aid drying up, BiH faces a mounting current account deficit, which, without major 
structural reforms could threaten economic stability in a matter of years.  
 
Foreign direct investment (FDI) has 
increased steadily over the last several 
years, but remains extremely low, at $250 
million per annum (roughly $70 per 
capita), and is unlikely to grow significantly 
under current conditions. While many of 
the country’s small enterprises have been 
privatized, they have yielded virtually no 
new capital. And privatization of the large 
and strategic enterprises is at a standstill 
due to a cumbersome process and 
political interference. 
 
1c- Investment climate and private sector development 
 
With FDI unlikely to increase significantly in the near term, local investment is critical to 
unearthing new reserves. However, due to the bureaucratic maze, Bosnia’s informal sector 
continues to thrive, as it still represents an estimated 40% of the economy. And the incentives to 
leave the “gray economy” and respect the law are still few. When corruption does not stifle honest 
businesses and drive investment from the region, heavy bureaucracy and the multiplicity of 
administrative and legal jurisdictions do. 
 
Because under the constitution nearly all economic sectors are 
decentralized, inter-Entity trade can be more complicated than 
foreign trade. An entrepreneur wanting to operate in all the 
territory of BiH will have, for instance, to pay attention to 13 
different commercial laws, and multiple rulebooks and by-laws. A 
business registered in one Entity must officially open at least a 
branch (if not a fully different registered business) in the other 
Entity if they want to do business there. And despite efforts by 
the international community to streamline the process, 
registering a business still takes about three months, 36 steps, 
and is done in three different ways throughout the country. Once 
a company is operating, it has to comply with a host of 
procedures if it wants to hire an employee from the other Entity. 
Bank accounts, commercial leases, insurance certificates and 
official company stamps are just a few of the requirements that 
routinely turn entrepreneurs away from cross-Entity employment.  
 
Regulations inherited from the socialist era are still found in many laws and rulebooks, sometimes 
contradicting other legal texts. This creates a confusing environment where each investment is 
met by numerous fees. Until last year, a compulsory fee of 1% of annual turnover had to be paid 
to dinosaur-style chambers of commerce providing no sensible service to entrepreneurs. 
Similarly, any construction of business premises was taxed at a rate of 2% of its value, on the 
outdated and absurd pretext that the money would be used to maintain atomic bomb shelters.  
 
Other socialist-inherited regulations include a requirement for some SMEs to have an archive 
room managed by an employee holding an archivist diploma. Fax orders are still not considered 
as official business documents, so entrepreneurs need to send regular mail to each other and 
rubberstamp orders in order to close transactions officially. Bus lines can only operate from one 
Entity to the other if a second company from the other Entity is ready to create another bus line 
following the same route, but in the opposite direction. In the case of buying a car, the law has it 
that the sales tax is paid by the buyer in one Entity but by the seller in the other, which means 
that if the car is traded across the two Entities, it will either be double-taxed or not taxed at all.  
 
Table 2: Levels of FDI in BiH in recent years 
 
YEAR  Total, USD million 
1998  55.8 
1999  154.1 
2000  147.2 
2001  164.0* 
2002  241,2 
 
Source: Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic Relations of 
BiH  
*Source: Economist Intelligence Unit  
Picture 1: For the investor, 
the road to investment in 
Bosnia and Herzegovina is 
paved with riveted 
roadblocks.   
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Such are a few examples of the many administrative barriers that need to be knocked down in 
order to unlock local investment.  
 
Led by various international agencies, large-scale reforms have started to overhaul the business 
environment and stimulate private sector activity. Framework reforms include creating conditions 
to enable a wider variety of exports, better and faster privatization, implementation of bankruptcy, 
a more flexible labor market, strengthened domestic credit markets and enhanced corporate 
governance. BiH is far behind in the establishment of an institutional and regulatory framework to 
certify the standard of its goods for export. And, while progress has been made, the Single 
Economic Space
2 has not yet been fully achieved, a critical factor for developing the economy 
and a must for BiH to become an accession country into the European Union. 
 
Such programs, despite their evident long-term benefits for the country, are mostly moving 
forward to the extent that the international agencies are supporting them through conditionality, 
since the political arena is still divided along ethnic lines, and the nationalistic or personal vested 
interest of politicians often block progress. Nevertheless, some progress is being made on the 
following framework reforms as outlined in the BiH Development Strategy, approved by all three 
prime ministers in early December 2003: 
•  Implementation of indirect tax reforms -- merging the Customs Agencies and introducing VAT – 
two developments that will make it easier and fairer to do business in BiH.  
•  Creation of a single business registration system: The BiH framework law on business registration, 
which is under consideration by the Council of Ministers will eventually make it easier and quicker 
for foreign and BiH investors to set up companies and create new jobs, resolving the current 
expensive, bureaucratic and time-consuming system that discourages economic recovery.  
•  Implementation of a coherent, comprehensive trade policy: In addition to indirect tax reform, the 
authorities are pushed to move ahead with judicial reforms, and also with liberalizing the telecom 
and power sectors.  EC certification procedures have to be established to help companies get the 
required approvals that lets them sell their goods in the EU.  
•  Improvement of institutions and services to support business and promote exports: The aim is to 
establish an efficient and responsible, single statistics service to give potential investors an 
overview of the BiH economy. The Foreign Investor Promotion Agency, the State Veterinary 
Office, and the Institute for Standardization are finally coming under budgetary financing so that 
they can help BiH companies compete in the global export market. Establishment of a BiH 
Investment Guarantee Agency is under consideration.  
•  Implementation of a domestic debt package is planned, to verify all claims and make 
arrangements for repayments, also tackling the issue of bonds.  
•  Restarting of the privatization process, to make it easier to tender and privatize strategic 
enterprises, through  stronger, more efficient and more transparent Entity privatization agencies.   
•  Enactment of a Civil Procedure Code setting in place the kinds of commercial legislation and 
dispute-solving mechanisms that will give confidence to businesspeople and investors; and the 
enactment of basic contract laws. 
•  Implementation of a Law on Accounting and Auditing that will modernize this core function of 
business life. 
But these are not quick fixes, nor a very gratifying agenda for a young population of high-energy 
entrepreneurs who need quick results. To the contrary, the population is extremely skeptical of 
the government’s commitment to those reform efforts. They see reform as the responsibility of the 
International Community, and especially the High Representative who has the power, among 
other things, to enact or repeal legislation. Further, with the employed population earning an 
average wage of $250 a month, the general public is unresponsive to abstract issues such as 
business environment. The result has been a n absence of motivation for strategic reforms. 
                                                 
2 The EC Community Assistance for Reconstruction, Development and Stabilization (CARDS) program for BiH includes a 
sub-program, currently in its second phase, which aims to establish a Single Economic Space in BiH in line with the EU 
Aquis Communitaire and in order to facilitate the EU integration adoption through the necessary legislative, regulatory and 
institutional reforms.   
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Entrepreneurs, for example, prefer to apply their energy on navigating the existing system rather 
than fixing it. 
 
2- The Bulldozer Initiative as a complementary and sustainable reform 
process 
 
Active involvement and a sense of ownership by the key stakeholders in Bosnia’s economic future – 
the private sector – is key to building a sustainable constituency for reform as a complement to 
comprehensive reform processes. The “Bulldozer Initiative” launched in November 2002 by the 
Office of the High Representative is aimed at doing just that. The initiative is still ongoing, and is 
currently in the midst of the second of three phases, anticipated to be completed in the fall 2004. 
Already, though, the initiative has succeeded in securing enactment of 50 reforms, with another 50 
under parliamentary consideration. In a matter of months, this Initiative has generated a sense of 
progress and a new and authentic engagement by the business community, as well as an 
enhanced sense of responsibility by the government. This perceptible change in attitude – on the 
part of the authorities and in the business community – was the product of enlightened self-interest; 
businesspeople were provided with a mechanism through which they could secure reforms that 
help the economy in the long-term and help their own entrepreneurial efforts in the short and 
medium term. Politicians were provided with a mechanism whereby they gained credit for enacting 
reforms after much of the detailed drafting and canvassing had been done by others, in this case 




The Bulldozer Initiative uses a cutting edge methodology for economic reform and business 
climate improvement from the bottom up, by engaging core segments of the population and 
turning them into active constituents for reform and stability.  
 
The reform process was designed with two goals in mind:  
 
1)  to create a fast track record of reform by “bulldozing” through a complex legal 
system rife with red-tape and business disincentives;  
2)  to create a sustainable process in which the private sector could engage in a 
strong dialogue and partnership with the government.  
 
The Bulldozer Initiative does not aim at making framework changes. As a bottom-up initiative, it is 
designed to identify specific business roadblocks that are exclusively focused on the 
entrepreneur’s experience. As a complementary effort to the large-scale reform efforts already 
underway, the intent is to amend a few articles in a law, rather than to overhaul the law 
completely. This methodology is also designed to minimize political opposition: by leaving the 
overall equilibrium of the system in place, the methodology allows for a very limited room for 
maneuver among those who could potentially oppose the reform. If entrepreneurs explain 
pragmatically why an article is problematic and suggest a fix that does not jeopardize the rest of 
the edifice, then there are few reasons for the governments not to enact it. Still, the reform 
momentum created by the initiative made it possible to include several wide-reaching reforms as 
well. And by publicizing the successes broadly, the initiative has created a dynamic that is now 
facilitating the implementation of large scale structural reforms. 
 
2b- A partnership to bulldoze red tape 
 
The Bulldozer Committee was initiated by the High Representative Paddy Ashdown, who asked 
four other international agencies to join him in “bulldozing red tape”: the European Commission, 
the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank and USAID. This core group was coordinated 
from the Bulldozer Coordination Unit located at the OHR. The Unit was composed of a project 
director, an assistant and a manager. Hosted within OHR’s Economic Department, it worked quite 
independently, like a small business. It raised funding from the bilateral embassies of, 
successively, the United States, Switzerland, Norway, Italy and Holland. Funds were used for   
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salaries of one international and two nationals, travel, equipment and supplies, and most 
importantly nation-wide public awareness campaigns and public events. 
 
The process was initiated by the International Community. The impetus 
had to be given by the internationals because of the total distrust by the 
private sector of the government, and the manifest lack of interest by the 
government in listening to the private sector. The strategy chosen was 
iterative: a focus on active private sector participation would be given 
during a first phase where the government would only have a passive 
role. In a second phase, once the private sector was engaged and had 
proved that it could produce high quality reform work, the government 
would be invited to participate more actively. Finally a third phase would 
incorporate no International Community component, allowing the private sector and the 
government to actively interact on their own with only technical support provided to both. The 
phased approach bore fruit: ownership of the process was handed over to local entrepreneurs 
after six months, and to the government after eight. The question of its sustainability without the 
mediation of the international community is to be answered during the ongoing phase III. 
 
As soon as Phase I had started, with the aim of fostering private sector advocacy, the 
Coordination Unit quickly reached out to local private sector representatives and invited them to 
participate in the committee by proposing reforms. The role of the High Representative was 
important in that regard, as it gave people faith that the initiative was worth participating in. Little 
by little, many private sector advocacy groups became an integral part of the committee and 
rallied behind the Bulldozer “brand”. Over time, several hundreds of individuals and organizations 
submitted reform proposals. Thirty local associations, including regional business associations, 
municipal associations of entrepreneurs, the Employers’ Confederation of both Entities, the 
Women’s Business Network, the Central Bank, the Foreign Investment Promotion Agency, the 
Micro-Credit Network, and the Association of Honey and Bee Production, served as members of 
the Bulldozer Plenary Committee, evaluating and finalizing reforms. The Committee focused the 
energy of all those private sector advocates toward one single goal: to bulldoze red tape, as a 
means of improving the business climate. 
 
Figure 2: Reducing red tape as a means to improve the business climate 
 
 
2c- Role of the International Community  
 
As they were defined and processed, the Bulldozer reforms were  designed according t o 
benchmarks and principles that international agencies agreed to, so that they did not contradict or 
interfere with structural, top-down efforts. In a sense, the five international agencies served as a 
guarantee to the governments that the entrepreneurs w ere not going to hijack the process to 
request non-viable benefits, such as removing all taxes, etc, or that specific entrepreneurs were 
not going to use the process for their own exclusive benefits.  
 
Figure 1: The 
Bulldozer brand 
Enrooted in red tape, the 
administrative burden 
becomes  self-supporting, 
preventing  the economy 
from bearing fruits 
By cutting the red tape 
that is drawing all the 
energy out of the private 
sector, vital functions are 
slowly restored  
Once simplifications are 
fully implemented, fewer 
but stronger business 
roots enable the 
economy to bloom   
 
Page 9 of 51 
The IMF ensured that all selected reforms complied with sound macroeconomic standards. The 
World Bank ensured they corresponded to good poverty reduction strategies and that they fitted 
in the Bank’s Business Adjustment Credit. The European Commission guaranteed that each 
proposed change was compliant with EC standards, so that reforms would remove obstacles to 
the integration of BiH into the European Union. USAID participated in vetting the reforms against 
good private sector development principles. Lastly, the OHR ensured that reforms were politically 
doable in the context of a knotty local and international environment. Hence, Bulldozer reform 
proposals, once out of the production pipeline, were extremely robust. They bore the legitimacy of 
local entrepreneurs’ demands. They had been vetted by international  agencies. They made 
sense. 
 
2d- Engaging the Business Community 
 
Submitting such workable reforms requires a remarkable effort from the entrepreneur. However, 
under the status-quo, businesspeople are in any case obliged to spend time and energy trying to 
get around existing rules and regulations. When they do this, they do not go back to find the 
original source of the problem and advocate for change. In the case of an administrative permit, 
the resources, time, and (often) money of the entrepreneur may be used in a networking effort  to 
get to know someone working in the specific administrative department and, sometimes, bribing 
officials to obtain the permit. The Bulldozer Initiative had therefore to demonstrate to BiH 
entrepreneurs that their resources, t ime and money would be better spent on understanding 
where a problem came from, designing a legal solution (for instance an amendment to a law) and 
lobbying for its adoption. 
 
With that objective in mind, the Bulldozer Coordination Unit publicized early on an extremely tight 
time frame in which it planned to have reforms enacted. Using the slogan “50 Economic Reforms 
in 150 Days”, it created an impetus as well as an accountability that surprised many in both the 
local population and the international agencies. Making the timeframe publicly available from the 
start was part of an open door policy vis-à-vis the entrepreneurs and the media.  
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To educate the private sector and rally people to the Bulldozer Initiative, a “road show” was 
organized, using marketing-like techniques to “sell” the idea to entrepreneurs. Presentations were 
made in eight public meetings, which gathered more than 500 businesspeople in eight different 
cities.  
 
During those gatherings a form was distributed, which enabled the audience to submit ideas, 
either during the meeting, or to mail ideas to the Committee.  
 
The form is extremely simple in its 
conception. The only logo it carries is 
the Bulldozer logo. A table enables the 
submitter to indicate whom he or she 
represents. This table serves as a 
statistical tool, but it also demonstrates 
that the initiative is an inclusive one, 
working with companies, associations, 
public institutions, international 
agencies, etc. The aim of the form is to 
drive the submitter into a disciplined 
analysis of the issue. Below the table, 
four questions are asked: 1- What is the 
issue at stake? 2- Why is it a business 
roadblock? 3 - What is the Bulldozing 
solution? and 4 - What are the specific 
action items? (what specific articles 
need to be amended, whether an 
instruction needs to be sent by a minister, etc.)  
 
2e- Processing reforms 
 
Drawing up its first round of reforms, the Committee received about 250 submissions. Issues 
spanned all sectors of the economy: enterprise law, banking and finance, tax, exports, trade, 
labor, environment and so on. They included for example compulsory fees for professional 
associations, double taxation issues, cumbersome administrative procedures, and job-destroying 
labor practices.  
 
Within the Bulldozer Committee, each proposal was studied in 
detail by a qualified group of lawyers and economists, who 
evaluated the proposals, developed legal solutions and 
assessed the likely consequences for the economic 
environment.  Each reform was subjected to a rigorous 
cost/benefit analysis, and industry experts were invited to 
comment on ideas before they were taken to the next stage. This 
way, the Bulldozer Committee ensured that individual 
entrepreneurs could not exploit the process in order to serve 
their own interests and without rendering real economic benefits 
to a sector of the market.  
 
Once formatted, a Bulldozer reform is a few pages long and 
indicates the specific laws to amend in each jurisdiction. It 
includes the text of existing articles, shown side by side with the 
new text recommended for adoption.  
 
During Phase I of the initiative, the Bulldozer Coordination Unit received all reform proposals and 
did the filtering work, to present a subset of  70 reforms to all members of the committee. This 
presentation took place during three “Plenary Sessions” that each constituted an event for the 
business community. Each Plenary Session was typically attended by 40 to 50 participants, plus 
sometimes the press. All proposals were publicly discussed, and a vote was held at the end of 
Figure 5: The Roadblock 
Submission Form 
Figure 4: One of the images used to convince 
the private sector to engage in the Bulldozer 
reform process 
 Today                                 Tomorrow 
(Full-size form is shown in Annex I)   
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the sessions. The five international agencies had a veto power that could be used to prevent a 
reform from being adopted. The Committee, then composed of about 20 different associations 
(which each had a vote) in addition to the five international agencies, voted on the best 50 
proposals to present to the governing bodies.  
 
 Table 3: The first 50 selected reforms proposed to the government 
    
Enterprise: 
R01 Harmonizing the LLC Minimum Capital Requirement 
R02 Eliminating Double Corporate Profit Taxation 
R03 Removing Counterproductive Amendments in the RS Law on Privatization of State Capital 
R04 Eliminating Investment Barriers through FBiH Law on Business Companies Reform   
R05 Clarifying Audit Requirements of Auditor General in RS 
R06 Removing Mandatory Fee for Shelter in FBiH 
R07 Removing Mandatory Fee for Shelter in the RS 
R08 Breaking Monopoly of RS Geodesy and Property-Legal Affairs administration 
R09 Easing Law Firms Operation through Amendments to the Law on Lawyer Profession 
R10 Easing Barcode Issuing Requirements for Publishing Companies 
Environment and Forestry: 
R11 Removing Double Taxation of Revenue for FBiH Forest Industry 
R12 Introduction of New Water Standards at State level 
R13 Protecting the Stock of BiH Fruit & Nut Trees 
R14 Promoting Recycling Business and Environmental Protection in FBiH 
Tourism: 
R15 Rationalization of Tourism Companies’ Contributions and Accommodation Tax in FBiH  
R16 Improving Mechanism of Tourism and Hospitality Inspection in FBiH 
R17 Easing BiH Entry Visas regime for Foreign Nationals 
R18 Improving Tourism through Enrollment of BiH in InterRail Pass Program 
Labor: 
R19 Easing RS Craft Companies Operation and Reducing Red Tape through Amendments to the Craftsmanship Law  
R20 Recommending Statewide Amendments to Provisions on Training and Volunteer Labor 
R21 Harmonizing Pre-Conditions for Bar Exam Across BiH to Ensure Equal Opportunity in Access to Market  
R22 Harmonizing Conditions for Company Activity Registration 
Trade: 
R23 Establishing Principles on Moving Sales Tax Point of Collection 
R24 Easing Export of Drugs and Medicines from BiH 
R25 Reducing Import Cost and Delays Relating to Phyto-Sanitary Certificate 
R26 Free Trade Zones Operation Under the BiH Law on Free Trade Zones 
R27 Harmonizing Vehicle Trade Mechanisms Across BiH 
Registration: 
R28 Removing Need for Registration of Foreign Representative Office in Both Entities 
R29 Simplifying Registration Procedure of Foreign Direct Investments in FBiH 
R30 Simplifying Registration Procedure of Foreign Direct Investments in RS 
R31 Enabling Company De-Registration in FBiH 
R32 Enabling Company De-Registration in RS 
R33 Enabling Company De-Registration in Brcko 
Chambers: 
R34 Transforming FBiH Chambers Membership from Compulsory to Voluntary 
R35 Transforming Chambers Membership in RS from Compulsory to Voluntary 
R36 Helping Family Businesses by Removing Compulsory FBiH Craft Chamber Membership   
R37 Helping Family Businesses by Removing Compulsory RS Craft Chamber Membership  
R38 Transforming Cantonal Chambers Membership from Compulsory to Voluntary 
Finance: 
R39 Defining the Term CAPITAL in Federation Laws and Practice       
R40 Enabling Original Use of Bill of Exchange in FBiH           
R41 Simplifying Procedures for Conveying Banks Assemblies in FBiH   
R42 Execution on Claim on Bank Accounts       
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R43 Easing Collateral Transferability         
R44 Shortening Procedures for Increasing Bank Capital   
Transport: 
R45 Liberalization of Bus Scheduling in the Federation   
R46 Removing the Reciprocity Rule in Inter Entity Transport     
R47 Liberalization of Inter Entity Transport Regulations for Helping Refugee Return Transportation    
R48 Facilitating the Process of Obtaining CEMT Truck Licenses     
R49 Streamlining Regulations for Oversize Truck Loads in BiH       
R50 Correcting Unfair competition in RS Oversized Transport Fees Against FBiH companies 
 
Once the package of 50 reforms was completed, a “book of 50 Bulldozer reforms” was produced 
and formally handed over to the prime ministers in a public event, in the presence of journalists, 
and followed by a press conference. The book contained the full text of the reform, the reform 
summary, and a table summarizing action items per jurisdiction 
 
Table 4: Track-list for Bulldozer Phase I Reform number 20 
#  Reform title  Juris-
diction  Concerned law  Specific articles 
FBiH  Federation Labor Law (Official Gazette 
FBiH 43/99; 32/00)  Art.26; Art.27; Art.28 
RS  RS Labor Law (Official Gazette RS 
38/00; 40/00; 41/00; 47/02) 





Volunteer Labor  Brcko 
District 
Brcko District Labor Law (Official 
Gazette BD 7/02)  Art.21; Add 2 new articles 
 
Annex 1 shows two detailed reforms from Bulldozer Phase I, as presented in the final package of 50. 
 
2f- Lobbying for reform adoption 
 
Following the hand-over of the reforms, intensive dialogue took place between the Bulldozer 
Committee and the BiH Council of Ministers, and the RS and FBiH Governments. A coordinator 
was appointed in each government. These coordinators dispatched their respective proposals to 
the relevant Ministries, and asked for comments, reactions, and counter-proposals. 
 
Each Ministry formed working groups to look at each reform and formulate a response. The 
Bulldozer Committee met with all the principal Ministries and discussed the specific reforms and 
the working-group responses in great detail. In each case, there was complete agreement, or a 
legal middle ground was negotiated that did not detract from the original intent of the proposal. 
 
In Phase I, the BiH, FBiH, RS and Brcko parliaments adopted all the Bulldozer amendments, just 
30 days beyond the original 150-day deadline. Despite this delay, the results were attained within 
a timeframe that had never been met before, an average of one economic reform every four 
days. Some of the reforms were dealt with through government decision, while others (consisting 
of legal amendments to existing laws) were sent to the parliaments.  
 
3- Regionalization and Government involvement 
 
In order to build on Phase I’s success, Phase II of the Bulldozer Initiative was launched in June 
2003. The aim of Phase II was to select another 50 reforms while continuing to promote the 
legitimate interests of the business community, local advocacy associations and civil society, and 
to create a working partnership with elected representatives. 
 
3a- Taking it local 
 
After the first successes of the initiative, the Bulldozer Coordination Unit decided to minimize the 
role of internationals while giving the lead to local advocates, organized in Regional Bulldozer   
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Committees. The declining role of the International Community was formalized in a modification 
of the veto power, which progressively disappeared during Phase II of the initiative.  
 
Each Regional Committee is made up of an average of 12 different associations and a few 
private entrepreneurs. Each Committee appointed a Coordinator and two co-coordinators who 
dispatched the work in their region, re-routed information coming from the Bulldozer Coordination 
Unit, and represented their Regional Committee in the Plenary Sessions organized by the 
Bulldozer Coordination Unit. Altogether, six Regional Committees were created, as well as a 
nation-wide specialized Committee on Agriculture, Agribusiness and Natural Resources. Their 
focus is to identify new reforms at the municipal/cantonal/regional level as well as to oversee the 
implementation of Phase I reforms at the local level.  
 
The seven Bulldozer Committees expanded the dialogue 
already established by the original Bulldozer Committee 
with the country’s elected representatives by including the 
trade unions. This helps the Committees identify reform 
areas that concern BiH society as a whole. B y giving 
responsibility to all three partners (private sector, governing 
bodies and unions) in developing, bringing forward, and 
implementing reforms, support for the overall process is 
enhanced. Each of the three partners has a real interest in 
reforming the BiH business environment. 
 
Regional Bulldozer Committees are organized on a 
voluntary basis, and they do not receive financial support 
from the Bulldozer Coordination Unit. Self-financing 
appeared in some Regional Committees, where funds were 
offered b y entrepreneurs to conduct local advocacy 
awareness campaigns.  Phase II heavily relied on the 
Regional Bulldozer Committees to do part of the reform 
filtering work. They distributed blank forms to enterprises in 
their regions, organized many public meetings to inform 
people about the initiative and created public awareness 
campaigns. Such campaigns have included a TV spot in one region, newspaper ads in another, 
and the establishment of a telephone “hotline” in yet another. Each Regional Bulldozer 
Committee distributes blank forms, collects proposals, organizes Regional Plenary Sessions, and 
selects a subset of reforms, which are then sent to the Bulldozer Coordination Unit for final 
selection. 
 
3b- The Protocol for Prosperity and the creation of governmental Emergency Reform Units 
 
In an important symbolic event the three Prime 
Ministers, the six Heads/Speakers of Parliaments, 
the Mayor of Brcko, and seven Bulldozer local 
representatives signed an agreement called “The 
Protocol for Prosperity”, which commits them to 
continuing and deepening their support for the 
Bulldozer reform process. 
 
Following this commitment, the governments have 
established four inter-ministerial working groups at 
the State, Entity and District levels called 
“Emergency Reform Units”. The Emergency Reform 
Units are now the governmental counterpart of the 
Bulldozer Committee. Their role is to assess the 
reforms proposed by the private sector through cost 
benefit analysis, and to negotiate internally with the 
Figure 6: Each regional 
Bulldozer Committee 
gathers proposals from both 
sides of the Inter-Entity 
Boundary Line (IEBL) 
Picture 2: Signature of the Protocols 
for Prosperity   
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different government departments concerned with the reforms. A copy of the Protocol for 
Prosperity is provided in Annex IV. 
 
The Emergency Reform Units enable a symmetrical processing of reforms between the private 








3c- 50 new reforms 
 
In Phase II, a new package of 50 reforms was handed over to the governments on October 4
th 
2003 with the goal that they be enacted by Parliaments or by July 2004. Phase III would begin 
then, characterized by complete localization of the initiative: the Bulldozer Coordination Unit will 
be disconnected from any international agency and all regional and specialized committees will 
be linked through a state-level Bulldozer NGO. 
 
The selection process in Phase II demonstrated the thoroughness of the proposed amendments. 
Approximately 95% of the proposed ideas did not make it through the selection process. This 
means that the data processing and legwork to obtain 50 reforms was significant. Criteria of ease 
of implementability were added to the Phase I criteria of macroeconomic stability, EC standard 
application, sound development practice compliance and political  feasibility. Having learned from 
Phase I, the Regional Bulldozer Committees considered all those factors when pre-selecting 





Figure 7: The Bulldozer reform process in Phase II   
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Table 5: Selection process for the first Plenary Session of Bulldozer Phase II: 19 proposals 
selected from 366 suggestions 
 
BULLDOZER 
































selected in First 
Plenary Session 
for inclusion into 
final book of 50 
Proposals 
on hold for 
further 
review 
Northwest  500  29  27  8  7  6  6  1 
Northeast  700  40  20  10  5  4  4   
Banja Luka Region  600  70  40  10  4  2  2  2 
Sarajevo Region  450  132  32  12  9  7  5  3 
Herzegovina  200  15  10  4  3  1  1  2 
Central Bosnia  1200  80  25  10  3  1  1  4 
Total  3650  366  154  54  31  21  19  12 
Ratio    ￿ 100%  42%  15%  8.5%  6%  5%   




    6  3  2  2  1  1 
 
The 50 reforms selected in Phase II after three Plenary Sessions demonstrate that once engaged 
in a reform process, the private sector is quick to expand its reform ideas to the society at large. 
Issues such as national holydays and the rights of disabled persons that have made it to the final 
package illustrate the willingness of participants to broaden the scope of their work beyond issues 
of immediate concern to entrepreneurs.  
 
Table 6: The second round of 50 reforms proposed to the government 
 
Administrative requirements 
R01 Simplification of invoicing procedures for partnerships and sole proprietor enterprises 
R02 Removing staff archivist requirements for SMEs in Tuzla Canton 
R03 Abolishing compulsory daily travel orders for use of company vehicles 
R04 Abolishing obligatory six-month financial statements for companies 
R05 Enabling business transactions through recognition of faxed orders as written documents 
R06 Simplifying procedure of publishing official gazettes 
Enterprise 
R07 Improving BiH IT sector by helping to reduce monopoly through stricter implementation of the Law on Communications 
R08 Removing monopoly in marketing campaign business 
R09 Abolishing Municipal special fee/tax on taxpayers’ total yearly income for financing Special Institutions 
R10 Implementation rules for FBiH Law on craft 
R11 Harmonizing entity Laws on Profit Tax 
Finance 
R12 Defining public revenues that belong to municipalities in FBiH 
R13 Enabling growth of local non-profit sector through limited tax-relief for donors 
R14 Improving access to finance for SMEs via urgent adoption of draft law on Financial Leasing in FBiH and RS 
R15 Removing barriers for the sale of stocks by small shareholders in the RS 
R16 Improving ability of RS companies to repay debt by harmonizing high daily interest rates with those in FBiH 
Forestry / environment / agriculture 
R17 Protecting the environment wood industries and forestry stock in BiH through regulating exports of raw logs 
R18 Creation of a State Council for Agriculture, Forestry and Rural Development 
R19 Enabling development of natural honey business in BiH by establishing required legislation 
R20 Establishment of FBiH Veterinary Chamber 
R21 Defining competencies between the Federation and Cantons in using natural resources 
R22 Harmonization of the entities laws on Veterinary 
R23 Improving business environment for food and vegetable processing companies 
R24 Harmonization of business conditions in the RS and FBiH for agriculture production   
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Investment 
R25 Equalizing rights of local and foreign investors 
R26 Clarifying incentives to foreign direct investment in the Federation Law on Corporate Income Tax 
R27 Harmonization of entity regulations on court company registration fees 
R28 Sales tax exemption for catalogs and printed brochures that are distributed free of charge 
R29 Easing the entry of young lawyers to the profession by harmonization of registration fees between Federation and RS 
Bar chambers 
Labor 
R30 Achieving single economic space through a BiH Law on Holidays 
R31 Enabling employment of disabled persons by introducing tax relief 
R32 Harmonizing entity laws on pensions in order to reduce black market employment of pensioners 
R33 Enabling independent contractors to work by amending the RS Law on Physical Planning 
R34 Removing discrimination based on entity citizenship in the RS Law on Crafts and FBiH Law on Trade 
Trade 
R35 Improving product safety and quality compliance through amendments to the BiH Law on Consumers Protection  
R36 Reforming the existing regulations on public procurement in BiH 
R37 Protecting local production by implementing the Law on Quality Control in BiH 
R38 Exempting demining equipment from customs fees 
R39 Request governments to enact law on customs offenses at state level 
R40 Removing and resolving obstacles to the establishment of the Tourist Organization of BiH 
R41 Reducing expansion of black market by authorizing market inspectors to confiscate goods 
R42 Improving business environment by changing the base for calculation of membership fees for tourist communities 
R43 Facilitating export by simplifying internal processing procedures (the so called import for export) 
R44 Harmonization of FBiH and RS trade laws 
R45 Repeal of the Law on Allocation of Funds for Regular and Safe Railway Traffic in the RS 
R46 Ensuring quality standards of petroleum and fuel imports to BiH through harmonization and clarification of legislation 
Utilities and construction 
R47 Amendments to the FBiH Law on Physical Planning and Law on Construction 
R48 Enhancing municipal competencies for the issue of town planning approvals and construction permits  
R49 Harmonizing water supply fees between FBiH and RS 
R50 Supporting business development by requesting Governments to urgently perform a pricing review in Elektroprivredas 
and remove obstacles to the implementation of Power III project  
 
Annex 2 shows two detailed reforms from Bulldozer Phase II, as presented in the final package 
of 50. 
 
3d- Shifting perceptions and sustaining momentum through media  
 
An important part of the initiative relied on a  strong 
grassroots and public awareness effort since the level of 
involvement of local businesses was determined by their 
belief in, or skepticism about, the results, and by their 
understanding of the lobbying mechanism. They needed to 
see for themselves that it could be done, and how to 
achieve concrete results. The media strategy was 
therefore centered on four approaches. 
 
The first strategy was to create an open-door policy with 
journalists: Information on the day-to-day Bulldozer 
process was given out continuously by the Bulldozer 
Coordination Unit through press releases, interviews or 
informal breakfasts with journalists. When journalists 
inquired about the progress of the initiative, all details were 
provided, including negative ones such as internal 
disagreements, potential negative short-term impact of 
Picture 3: 84,000 copies of a 
brochure with a comic strip 
explaining the 50 reforms to  
the average citizen    
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some reforms, etc.  
 
Second, a  strong public awareness campaign was organized. The Bulldozer Committee 
published a 64 page information brochure detailing the first 50 reforms, including a comic strip, 
“The Adventures of Max”, telling the story of a frustrated entrepreneur who overcomes his 
problems by joining the Bulldozer effort. 84,000 copies of this Brochure were distributed in local 
newspapers in three different languages (Bosnian, Serb, Croat). 200,000 copies of a specific 
brochure on issues related to privatization were similarly distributed. 100,000 copies of a 
brochure detailing the results of Phase I reforms will be distributed in February 2004. 
 
Thirdly, original press conferences were organized to mark specific achievements, such as: 
 
•  Bulldozer Committee holds a public information meeting (press conferences with local 
media for each local meeting) 
•  Bulldozer Committee meets in Plenary Session and votes on reforms (televised voting 
session broadcast on prime time news) 
•  Committee completes its preliminary work (entrepreneurs unfolding a banner reading “D 
minus 39 days for the government” in front of journalists) 
•  Committee hands over reforms to government (in front of a real bulldozer) 
•  Entrepreneurs enter parliaments to explain reforms 
 
Lastly, specific symbolic events were designed for 
symbolic locations. The press conference that was 
organized in front of a real bulldozer became a 
real turning point in the political life of the country. 
For the first time, the Chair of the Council of 
Ministers made a public and formal commitment 
with businesspeople: together, they would enact 
50 reforms in 150 days. And reforms would be 
judged on their merits instead of on internal 
politics, as is often the case in BiH.  
 
The picture of the Prime Minister wearing a red 
construction hat was seen the following day on the 
front page of all BiH newspapers. The media 
began to cover entrepreneurs in a positive way. 
Instead of being portrayed as “crooks trying to 
benefit from the system”, they appeared as 
“frustrated stakeholders eager to take over the 
future of their country”. One major paper began to run a daily column featuring local 
entrepreneurs and the changes in legislation they would like to see. It was a true awakening for 
BiH businesses and it created a real breakthrough in public opinion, with lasting impact.  
 
Another symbolic event took place in the National Theatre, where the initiative succeeded in 
bringing all the parliaments of State, Entity and District jurisdictions together for the first time 
since they were brought into existence by the Dayton Peace Accords of 1995, to discuss reforms 
on their merits with the Bulldozer Committee.  
 
Another event mentioned earlier, the signing of the Protocols for Prosperity, took place at the 
Botanical Gardens. It was the first document since the peace treaty to bear the signature of all the 
heads of the executive and parliamentary bodies. To mark the event, each of the 17 signatories 
planted a rose tree in an area that was named the “Prosperity Garden”.  
 
Using this four-point approach enabled the Bulldozer Committee to maintain a high momentum at 
all times, which was exceptionally beneficial to the dialogue process. Every week the media 
features issues that are identified  as economic roadblocks by the Bulldozer Committee. The 
press helps sustain a national debate on economic reforms and helps keep small and medium 
entrepreneurs informed about the specifics of the legislation that has slowed down their 
Picture 4: A turning point in the 
campaign: The public image of the 
Prime Minister standing in front of a 
bulldozer and behind a banner reading 
“50 economic reforms in 150 days”    
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“Bosnia Charging 
Business Barricades”
“Bosnia Bulldozing Trade Barriers” 
“Bosnia harvests fruits of  
 brighter future” 
Box 1: The Bulldozer makes headline 
news in world top newspapers 
development. Politicians now often talk about doing things “the Bulldozer way” and a variety of 
commissions and working groups have now 
been set up in the parliaments under that very 
impetus. 
 
The success of the Bulldozer initiative attracted 
attention well beyond BiH. Articles appeared in 
the New York Times, the London Times, the 
Financial Times and other international media, 
for once talking about the originality and 
effectiveness of a new BiH reform model, rather 
than the slowness of post-war recovery.  
 
These reports inaugurated a fundamental shift in 
the image of the country abroad, carrying the 
message that BiH is now open for business. This 
in turn has had a profound impact on the society, 
by demonstrating that businesspeople  – 
meaning the average citizen  – can effect 




4- Dangerous curves and safety features 
 
Under such an impetus, it would have been very easy for the Bulldozer to go “off-road”.  
 
Actually, the Bulldozer did drive through dangerous curves, bordering a few  issues usually 
tackled through more systematic top-down approaches. As such it attracted legitimate criticism. 
The bottom-up process, when it dealt with contentious issues, also prompted anger among the 
losing constituents.  
 
Under the kind of pressure that this produced, the success or failure of the initiative could easily 
have been confused with the government’s success or failure in implementing reforms. To 
allocate responsibilities very clearly and to ensure the legitimacy of the process throughout, a set 
of benchmarks was developed. These implementation measurement tools were key in assessing 
and communicating results.  
 
4e- Limits, skeptics and critics 
 
Despite massive support from the population and a strong media reach, the Bulldozer initiative 
has had many critics both in Bosnia and abroad. These fall into several categories: criticism by 
those who feel threatened by the process, natural skepticism that the Bulldozer reforms would not 
significantly change the economy, and concern that the Bulldozer  was overstepping its 
boundaries and jeopardizing long term reform processes. 
 
Among the critics of the first category were the Chambers of Commerce, which led anti-Bulldozer 
campaigns through articles and interventions with politicians. They felt directly threatened by the 
Bulldozer, which not only took over many of the ostensible functions of the Chambers, but which 
also proposed a reform to eliminate mandatory fees to support the Chambers. Certain political 
leaders, like Mr. Paravac from the Serb nationalist party, the SDS, who currently serves on the 
rotating tripartite Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina, early on was an outspoken opponent of 
the initiative, citing the “deregulation and chaos” that the Bulldozer was going to bring to the 
country’s economy, and fearing the dilution of the powers of his Entity, the Republika Srpksa. (He 
later supported the initiative after meeting the six Regional Bulldozer Committee Coordinators). 
Former Prime Minister and opposition leader Zlatko Lagumdzija on one occasion stood up in a 
public Bulldozer meeting to call Prime Minister Terzic a comedian for having worn a construction 
hat in front of a Bulldozer. Within the Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic Relations, a   
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Bulldozer reform dealing with delivery of export certificates was met with resentment from the 
technical staff, who felt the demanded policy change was placing in question the quality of their 
work. One of the ways the Bulldozer overcame such criticism was through targeted public 
awareness campaigns, which exposed facts and figures about every issue opposed by the vested 
interests, hence enrolling the public in the debate. 
 
Natural skeptics from both the local and international communities refused to believe that a 
bottom-up process could significantly impact the economy, and doubted that 50 economic 
reforms could be completed in 150 days. They disregarded the process as a true “bottom-up” one 
because it had been ignited by the OHR, a third party. Once the reforms where actually enacted, 
they argued that implementation would fail. These critics also argued that the micro nature of the 
reforms would have no real impact on the economy and was diverting attention from long-term 
processes. While it is true that the Bulldozer did not intend to make structural reforms, the 
dynamic for reform that it created must not be underestimated as a major factor that will facilitate 
such wide-reaching reforms. And while it is true that the High Representative was an unusually 
powerful matchmaker between the government and the private sector, the process did transform 
into a locally owned initiative, proving that the energy was present and had only to be unleashed.  
 
Other critics, primarily from international agencies, raised concern when the Bulldozer process 
started to tackle issues that clearly went out of the scope of the “micro-reforms” it had intended to 
process. When there were synergies between the development policies of the international 
agencies and the policy choices of the business community, donors were happy to u se the 
Bulldozer as a platform to voice their concern with the government. In the case of Bulldozer 
Phase I Reform number 23, which addresses moving the point of collection for excisable tax, the 
OHR and IMF were happy to have the impetus come from local businesses, although this had 
long been an IMF policy objective. But this willingness to let the Bulldozer process lead structural 
policies was limited to the extent it promoted the International Community’s own agenda and 
priorities. A semi-crisis occurred, for instance, with Bulldozer Phase II Reform number 17, when 
the Bulldozer Committee on Agriculture decided to request an export ban on raw logs, until a new 
forestry certification mechanism would enable the export of wood while preserving both the local 
industry and the BiH ecosystem. Agreeing with the reform goal, which it had identified through 
consultations with the private sector, the World Bank opposed the approach of an export ban, as 
it contradicted its longer-term policy choice expressed in a Bank-funded multi-year forestry 
program. But despite this opposition, entrepreneurs decided to go for the quick solution of the ban 
and the reform was voted through as the international agencies no longer had veto power in the 
Plenary Sessions. Whether the government will decide to enact it or not remains to be seen. 
 
This example illustrates the limits of the Bulldozer process. Even if it is sponsored by international 
agencies, such a process will always remain private sector driven in its approach and in the 
recommendations it makes. Whether the international agencies can live with the results is 
another question. But it must be borne in mind that such disagreements are the sign of a healthy 
democratic process.  After all, one cannot wish to have a vibrant private sector advocacy process 
and at the same time expect it to remain on the sidelines, applauding politely every move made 
by internationals. 
 
4b- Benchmarks and implementation measurement tools 
 
Whatever solutions citizens and entrepreneurs propose to change things, ultimate responsibility 
still lies within the government. The Bulldozer Committee initiates and lobbies for reforms. The 
government is accountable for enacting them. And once the reforms have been published in the 
Official Gazette, responsibility for implementing them falls to the governments. Still, Committee 
members monitor implementation and discuss individual reforms with Ministers and departmental 
working groups.  
 
Designing and implementing Bulldozer reforms is a process that can usefully be divided into 10 
steps -- five are the responsibility of the Bulldozer Committee, and five are the responsibility of 
the government.   
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Each step must be taken before the next one is attempted. T his means that once a reform 
package has been handed over to the authorities, it is relatively easy to measure the government 
implementation performance on a scale of one to five.  
 
The score from 1 to 5 indicates how far the government got in the review and implementation 
process. 
 















Once reforms have been designed, the Bulldozer Committee’s role becomes that of a reform 
implementation watchdog. A bi-annual Bulldozer publication informs the public in this regard. The 
relevant government body receives a score for each reform that was proposed during the 
initiative. The message sent to the population  – and the government itself  – is that simply 
enacting a reform is not enough – the process must be taken through to full implementation if it is 
to deliver practical benefits.  
 
1              Review and analyze 
Dialogue and process 
Enact and publish 
Implement and follow-up 
Verify and measure 
1  2          
1  2  3       
1  2  3  4    
1  2  3  4  5   
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This process has to be moved forward in a deliberate and systematic way. The Emergency 
Reform Units, located in the Prime Ministers’ offices, make sure that reforms a re properly 
discussed, enacted in a timely fashion and implemented efficiently. 
 
A reform can be considered fully implemented only 
when citizens and entrepreneurs begin to benefit from 
it. But the speed at which reforms are implemented 
also depends on the types of reform themselves. 
Some reforms have an immediate impact. These “fast 
result” reforms start to deliver benefits almost as soon 
as they are published in the Official Gazette. Some 
other reforms 
take effect little by 
little. The impact 
of these “slow 
results” reforms is 
more difficult to 
assess since as 
much as two 
years might pass 
between adoption 
of the reform and 
its full 
implementation. 
However sometimes, results can begin to show right away. 
For instance investors, knowing that a reform is in  the 
pipeline, may decide to speed up investment in order to be 
operational when the reform is fully implemented. 
 
5- Assessment of impact  
 
In its ongoing reform efforts, the Bulldozer Committee seeks optimal paths to stimulate growth 
while reducing poverty. In that regard, impact assessment is a key means of setting future reform 
priorities, improving the dialogue process and increasing both the quality and the 
“implementability” of the proposed reforms. Through indicators and benchmarks developed during 
Phase II, teams involved with the initiative assessed results of Phase I while planning and 
managing the consequences of reform choices. Key questions they had to answer were: Did the 
reform reach their goals? Did the ultimate beneficiary benefit from the reform? How do Bulldozer 
reforms facilitate sustainable development? What is the reform’s influence on civil society at 
large? Do the reforms correspond to the country’s own reform process, and do they help align the 
country’s reform process with the agenda of international agencies? 
 
5a- Impact on investment climate 
 
All reforms processed through the Bulldozer Committee aim at improving the business climate of 
the country, according to at least one of six “business climate improvement indicators”, which the 
Bulldozer Committee defines as follows: 
 
￿ Create more jobs 
￿ Bring more tax revenue to the authorities 
￿ Free up capital for investment 
￿ Boost exports 
￿ Reduce the administrative burden 
￿ Reduce the gray economy 
 
For every reform it is important to measure and quantify the results in each of these categories. If 
there is a quantifiable result for at least one category, then it can be said that the reform has been 
beneficial. However, the reforms being relatively recent, the data are not yet readily available for 
Box 2: A “slow result” reform: 
Creating a State Drug Agency 
 
Reform number 24 of Bulldozer Phase I was 
finalized by a commitment of the State 
authorities to create a State Drug Agency. 
This commitment was published in the BiH 
Official Gazette, but it was only a first step. 
Following that, legislation had to be drafted in 
cooperation with government and industry 
representatives. Next, the legislation will have 
to be finalized and adopted. Then, the Ministry 
of Health will have to create the Statute of the 
Agency. Its financing will have to be included 
in the annual BiH budget. Following that, the 
first employees of the Agency will be hired. 
Only after a full year of phased 
implementation, will it be possible to register 
medicines at this single point for the whole of 
BiH, thus ensuring the safety of citizens, 
enabling exports and ensuring implementation 
of a single BiH economic space for the 
industry.  
Box 3: A “fast result” 
reform: The bomb shelter 
fee. 
 
Reform  number 07 of Bulldozer 
Phase I demanded cancellation of 
article 179 of the FBiH Law on 
Defense, which required two percent 
of the value of commercial 
construction to go to municipalities for 
the maintenance of a bomb shelter. 
The Official Gazette decree was 
applicable immediately. This is a Fast 
Result reform because from the day 
of its publication, nothing else was 
needed but to show the municipal 
clerk the copy of the official gazette to 
register a building permit without 
being charged the two-percent fee.   
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all of them. Such results measurement was attempted for the 50 economic reforms achieved 
under Bulldozer Phase I and is to be published in early March 2004 in a public information 
brochure. Annex 3 shows how quantifiable results for three different reforms of Bulldozer Phase I 
are communicated to the public.  
 
Overall, some Bulldozer reforms can be said to have achieved their goal: they have had a 
positive impact on the economy. But it is early to tell, and no systematic data gathering campaign 
has been so far organized to measure the impact. The reforms themselves have, in their 
respective sectors, improved business conditions, as shown in the 12 examples in Table 7. This 
assessment can only be made for Phase I reforms, which were enacted in April 2003.  
 
Table 7: Impact on investment climate of selected Phase I reforms 
 
“R01 Harmonization of LLC Minimum Capital Requirement”  
has lowered the amount needed to create a limited liability 
company from as much as 10,000 KM to 2,000 KM in all 
jurisdictions. Subsequently, numbers of companies being 
registered have increased in many locations, especially 
regarding conversion of home-based activities to limited 
liability companies. The reform also lowered the minimum 
share from as much as 2,000 KM to 100 KM, now enabling up 
to 20 small investors with 100 KM each to start up a business. 
In Tuzla Canton, registration of LLC have increased 27% after 























￿ Create more jobs 
￿ Bring more tax revenue to the 
authorities 
￿  Free up capital for investment 
o Boost exports 
o Reduce the administrative 
burden 
￿ Reduce the gray economy 
“R06 Removing mandatory fee for shelter in FBiH” 
has deleted a clause in the FBiH Defense Law that obliged 
investors to pay a 2% fee on the value of the construction of 
business premises to maintain municipal bomb shelters that 
were virtually inexistent. The reform has enabled investors to 
increase their return on investment on commercial 
construction of 2%. It also deleted the incentive for investors 
not to declare constructions, thus reducing the gray market. 
For a mid-size Canton, if an average of 50 commercial 
building permits are delivered per month for an average 
construction value of 30,000 KM, the reform has potentially 
liberated a capital of 360,000 KM per year that can be 























o Create more jobs 
o Bring more tax revenue to the 
authorities 
￿  Free up capital for investment 
o Boost exports 
o Reduce the administrative 
burden 
￿ Reduce the gray economy 
“R20 Statewide amendments to provisions on training and 
volunteer labor” 
has enabled internships to take place in the public service by 
amending articles in the Labor Laws of three jurisdictions, thus 
providing a new large pre-job market for the youth population 
and encouraging their interest in government work. No 
numerical impact has been measured yet, but universities have 























￿ Create more jobs 
o Bring more tax revenue to the 
authorities 
o Free up capital for investment 
o Boost exports 
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burden 
o Reduce the gray economy 
“R21 Harmonize pre-conditions for Bar exam across BiH to 
ensure equal opportunity in access to market” 
has brought down from 4 to 2 years the period young lawyers 
have to train before being able to open their own law firm. The 
2 year period was already in use in one jurisdiction. The other 
one was requesting 4 years of training, while the Bars of the 
jurisdictions are reciprocal. The reform has enabled half the 
lawyers of BiH to gain 2 years in their time-to-market after 
passing the Bar. The numerical impact on the GDP cannot be 
measured yet but still, accessing the job market two years 
earlier means being able to be employed, paying tax or even 
opening new firms 2 years earlier, translating into more tax 
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“R23 Principles on Moving Sales Tax Point of Collection” 
has moved the point of collection of sales tax for excisable 
goods from point of sales to point of import or production. 
Full implementation started on August 1
st 2003, only three 
months after the adoption of the bulldozer reform by all 
jurisdictions. Increase in tax revenues jumped immediately 
following the change. In the RS, revenue collection went from 
an average 6.8 million KM per month before the reform to an 
average 12.9 million KM per month after (a 89% increase). In 
the Federation, the increase, slightly lower due to cantonal 
discrepancies, still represents a 45% increase in tax 























o Create more jobs 
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￿ Reduce the gray economy 
 “R25 Reducing import cost and delays relating to phyto-
sanitary certificate” 
has reduced the number of days the cotton imported from the 
EU is held at the BiH border crossing for administrative 
verification from 5 days to 1. Cotton is needed to process 
thread, which is then exported back to the EU with an 
important added value. Depending on the volume of cotton 
each day lost at the border can have a cost of 10,000 to 
50,000 KM. The reform created as much savings for those 
textile companies. They can also respond faster on large 
orders, thus ensuring sound relationships with their clients 
























o Create more jobs 
o Bring more tax revenue to the 
authorities 
￿  Free up capital for investment 
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burden 
o Reduce the gray economy 
“R28 Removing need for registration of foreign 
representative office in both entities” 
has enabled international companies to set up their 
preliminary office in BiH by registering in a single location 
instead of three, thus greatly reducing the barrier of entry as 
well as giving a positive image of a unified country. Such 
result is not measurable with numbers. However in terms of 
























o Create more jobs 
o Bring more tax revenue to the 
authorities 
o Free up capital for investment 
o Boost exports 
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burden 
o Reduce the gray economy 
“R30 Simplifying registration procedure of foreign direct 
investments in RS” 
has reduced the number of steps required to register foreign 
direct investment by half. Now instead of the foreign investor 
to register his investment in different places, as required by 
law, the burden is passed on to one Ministry only, which in 
turn internally reroutes the registration to other ones. Without 
fundamentally changing the registration system, it allows 
much better conditions for FDI. However it is unlikely that the 
reform by itself will increase FDI. But still, it facilitates its 























o Create more jobs 
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￿  Free up capital for investment 
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o Reduce the gray economy 
“R34 Transform FBiH Chambers Membership from 
Compulsory to Voluntary” 
has replaced the obligatory membership fee to Chambers 
with a voluntary one. Some Chambers requested as much as 
1% of the yearly turnover of companies in their jurisdiction. 
The reform has enabled investors to free up that important 
capital for internal investments rather than funding outdated 
Chambers providing poor (if any) business services. The 
voluntary fee has sent a clear signal to Chambers who have 
now started to reform themselves to attract companies to pay 
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“R33 Enabling company de-registration in Brcko” 
has permitted judges to de-register fictitious companies 
without the signature of the initial registrant (which obviously 
cannot be obtained since the companies are fictitious), thus 
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o Free up capital for investment 
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“R43 Easing collateral transferability” 
has given the opportunity to banks to resell packages of 
loans to other banks. So far since the implementation of this 
reform, 327 commercial and consumer loans with a total face 
value of approximately KM 90 million have been sold in BiH, 
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“R47 Liberalization of Inter Entity Transport Regulations for 
Helping Refugee Return Transportation” 
has permitted a number of refugees in hard-to-reach 
communities to create bus services with 8+1 passenger 
vans, thus enabling other refugees to reach urban areas 
while developing a new public transportation activity. While at 
least five such companies are known to have registered in 
one area, a systematic survey is now taking place to quantify 
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But more than the specific result achieved by each individual reform, the largest impact on the 
investment climate is the fact that those reforms were passed as a package, pushed by the 
private sector itself, and that they received a positive response from the government, thus 
creating a constructive dialogue between the private and the public sectors.  
 
The initiative succeeded in shifting the mindset of many entrepreneurs. For instance "Horizonte”, 
one of the main Austrian investment funds, had decided to stop investing in BiH because of the 
intensely bureaucratic behavior of the authorities and problems linked to corruption. After two 
years of dormant operations, they decided to reopen the fund because they considered the 
Bulldozer a positive indicator of improvement of the business climate.  
 
The Austrian bank HVB, which participated in the Bulldozer Initiative by submitting two of the 
selected first 50 reforms, decided to carry out the acquisition of National Profit Banka, more than 
doubling its presence in BiH by doing so. In his first speech marking the acquisition, the head of 
HVB mentioned the important role of the Bulldozer process in forming the Austrian headquarters’ 
view of the business environment of BiH.  
 
At the South East Europe Investment Conference, the BiH Foreign Investment Promotion Agency 
(FIPA) listed the Bulldozer Initiative as the number one factor of economic stability, noting that it 
helped create the “fastest improvement of business climate in Southeastern Europe”
3. 
 
Such examples, among many others, demonstrate a sure, if not measurable, improvement of the 
perception people now have of the country, and show how Bulldozer was key in shifting mindsets. 
But its reach, in fact, goes well beyond investment climate per se. 
                                                 
3 FIPA presentation, Zurich, September 4 2003   
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5b- Impact on civil society: bridging the constituency gap  
 
According to the International Crisis Group, the Bulldozer Initiative has “create[d] an alternative 
constituency for reform, [which does] not rely just upon the national parties”.
4 
 
In post-conflict situations, international institutions or third party countries often take the lead in 
establishing macroeconomic stability, promoting the rule of law, developing the private sector and 
building institutional capacity. The natural partner of the internationals for these activities is the 
local political leadership. This political layer often faces great legitimacy challenges, being either 
inherited from former systems, or facing strong skepticism by local constituents. Fighting for their 
own survival, local politicians quickly understand the give-and-take relationship with donors and 
financial institutions, who are in turn satisfied with the consensual agreement and “good will” of 
the local political layer. Clearly forgotten, 
the constituencies are not taken into 
account in the dialogue for reform, and 
fail to understand the benefits of 
structural (and therefore painful) 
changes that the country needs to go 
through on its way to economic recovery 
and political stability. If not cared for, the 
“constituency gap” can promptly lead to 
social unrest, or at least lack of support 
for reform and disillusion with the 
benefits of peace. In Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, the Bulldozer Initiative has 
succeeded not only in introducing 
important reforms but also in bridging 
the constituency gap by empowering 
and training local groups to advocate 
change, and in establishing sustainable 
democratic mechanisms for civic 
participation in government. By breaking 
through political and ethnic barriers, it 
has created a coherent and sustainable 
link through a new democratic dynamic.  
 
5c- Alignment of the reform process with international framework efforts 
 
It is very important to put the reforms pushed by the Bulldozer Initiative in the perspective of 
framework efforts that continue to achieve more systemic improvements.  
 
Because the filtering mechanism during the reform selection process involved the International 
Community and because of the governmental scrutiny through the Emergency Reform Units, the 
Bulldozer changes have b een mainly aligned with the reforms promoted in the country’s 
development strategy (expressed through the World Bank-sponsored Poverty Reduction Strategy 
Plan for BiH) and in the International Community’s agenda (as expressed by the Peace 
Implementation Council Steering Board of the OHR). In fact, the Bulldozer Initiative is mentioned 
in the strategy documents of the government and several international institutions. 
 
In its Development Strategy for BiH, the PRSP highlights the positive role that the Bulldozer 
Initiative has played. In the section Enhancing Business Climate to Attract Domestic and Foreign 
Investment, the document reads that “despite the fact that the Bulldozer committee owes its 
existence to a situation in which the private sector is able to influence governments, the work of 
the committee has given good results and led to improvement of the business climate in some 
                                                 
4 Agence France Presse (AFP), Friday, July 04, 2003 
Figure 10: Bridging the constituency gap by 
reaching directly to the core constituent   
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sectors. Activities of the Bulldozer Committee go along with the PRSP agenda and are a support 
to preparation of midterm Developmental Strategy BiH – PRSP.”
5 
 
Illustrating the growing private sector influence on governments the Development Strategy BiH – 
PRSP points to “the Bulldozer Committee, which has had the biggest influence on the 
governments so far. Even before the creation of the Bulldozer Committee, the private sector had 
asked for the adoption of the same reform measures that have eventually been instigated by this 
Committee. However, it was only due to the OHR’s creation of the Bulldozer Committee that 
governments have been pressured to take suggested measures into consideration.”
 6 
 
The World Bank Foreign Investment Advisory Service (FIAS) produced a report on BiH in 2001. 
According to  Jacqueline Coolidge, who led the reporting effort, the Bulldozer “managed to 
actually i mplement some of the reforms recommended in the FIAS report, that would have 
otherwise been left unattended by the governments”
7. FIAS contributed to the Bulldozer initiative 
by recommending a stronger involvement of the public sector, which later on translated into the 
creation of the Emergency Reform Units at the government level. A good cooperation with the 
World Bank ensured also that the Bulldozer reforms fitted into the Bank’s Business Adjustment 
Credit that aimed at improving the business environment through structural reforms. 
 
Mr. Javier Solana, EU High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), 
noted the goodwill that the Bulldozer Initiative created within the government by declaring that 
“Prime Minster Terzic’s government h as played an important role in pushing through the 50 
“Bulldozer” microeconomic reforms earlier this year  – reforms that will make it easier for 
entrepreneurs and investors to create new jobs”.
8 
 
The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) underlined in its 2003 Strategy Paper 
for Bosnia and Herzegovina that the key issue for the authorities was to push for a single economic 
space, and that “the bulldozer committee, represent[ed] a significant progress in that regard”.
9  
 
In its Stabilization and Association Report of 2003, the European Commission noted that “the 
[Bulldozer] initiative is welcome on several counts: it concentrates on practical concerns and 
should thus raise less political opposition and it has arguably built civil society by encouraging 
citizens to lobby in favor of issues which concern them.”
10 As such, it has been one of the factors 
taken into account in the Commission’s approval of Bosnia and Herzegovina’s Feasibility Study in 
November 2003.  
 
Lastly, the Organization for Economic Co-Operation and Development (OECD) in its Enterprise 
Policy Performance Assessment of 2003 for Bosnia and Herzegovina, described the Bulldozer 
reform process, noting that it represented a turning point for policy reform for the country.
11 
 
These citations by representatives or from reports of international agencies illustrate how 
alignment of the process was recognized. Indeed, the Bulldozer process took place in the context 
of many other initiatives led by various agencies, and it was aligned with their agendas. Alignment 
is an important factor to consider, as such initiative is not meant to take place in a vacuum or 
replace all other reform efforts but rather to give a supplementary impetus to larger agendas.  
 
6- Applicability of the process to different settings 
 
                                                 
5 Development Strategy BiH – PRSP Second Draft for Public Discussion, December 2003 
6 Development Strategy BiH – PRSP Second Draft for Public Discussion, December 2003 
7 Meeting between FIAS and Bulldozer members, 2003 
8 Interview with Javier Solana published by Dnevni Avaz (BiH), 24/09/2003 
9 The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), Strategy for Bosnia and Herzegovina, 29 April 2003. 
10 European Commission Stabilization and Association Report for Bosnia and Herzegovina, 26 March 2003 
11 Stability Pact; South East Europe Compact For Reform, Investment, Integrity And Growth; Bosnia And Herzegovina 
Enterprise Policy Performance Assessment; Prepared by the Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development 
and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development; September 2003   
 
Page 27 of 51 
The Bulldozer method obtained positive results in Bosnia Herzegovina, but can it be replicated 
elsewhere? The situation of BiH is surely unique due to the presence of a High Representative. 
However, Bosnia is not the only country where such an initiative has taken place.  
 
6a- The Bulldozer and other “Competitiveness Partnerships” 
 
Similar processes have been started in Nigeria, with the “Better Business Initiative”, in Turkey, 
with the “Reform Program for the Improvement of the Investment Environment” and in Vietnam, 
with the “Vietnam Business Forum”. These initiatives are described in more detail below. 
Many public/private advisory mechanisms  have also been initiated through NGOs across the 
world for decades. When targeted at improving the investment climate through concrete 
recommendations that enlist citizens in a country-wide or sector-wide movement, their intent and 
process are very closely related to those of the Bulldozer Initiative.  
 
Such may also be the case of Ghana’s Investors’ Advisory Council (GIAC) started in May 2002, 
followed by Tanzania’s Investors’ Round Table (IRT) in July and Senegal’s Presidential Investors’ 
Council (PIC) in November. The role of these councils is to promote dialogue between the 
government and senior executives of local and international companies on ways to improve the 
investment climate. As envisaged, the councils will identify obstacles to investment and focus on 
a limited number of issues, to generate concrete recommendations for action and/or further 
analysis. It is hoped that the councils will reinforce implementation of ongoing policy reforms, by 
providing feedback and an international investors’ perspective on a country’s efforts to become a 
sought-after location for investment. Benin, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Madagascar, and Uganda 




Such initiatives, that successfully overcome the lack of political will and/or capacity at the 
government level or within the private sector through a similar approach, could be described as 
“Competitiveness Partnerships”. 
 
Complementing the systemic approach and framework reform efforts of governments and 
international agencies, Competitiveness Partnerships mobilize the local business community to 
identify concrete legislative changes, advocate for their adoption and follow-up on reform 
implementation. By going the last mile in delivering concrete, quantifiable results across the full 
spectrum of private sector development indicators, Competitiveness Partnerships are establishing 
a renewed reform dynamic through government-backed public-private partnerships.  
 
6b- It takes three to tango 
 
A Competitiveness Partnership could be applied in a country with three key actors in place: the 
private sector, a potentially responsive government, and last but not least, a sponsor. Assessing 
the applicability of Competitiveness Partnerships amounts to assessing the readiness of those 
actors to interact. 
 
The private sector 
 
•  The private sector needs to feel a basic sense of security, and have a stake in reform.  
Entrepreneurs who face threats to life or limb are unlikely to start voicing their business 
concerns, either because it is not a vital priority for them and their families, or because 
doing so could put them in great danger. However, if the security situation is stabilized, 
then they will have a greater interest in improving the conditions in which they do 
business.  
•  It needs to be somehow organized, with some entrepreneurs able to provide leadership. 
A country with no business advocates whatsoever will be hard to mobilize. But if the 
country is already hosting, even disparately, some entrepreneur networks, business 
                                                 
12 Investor councils examples are cited from Jacqueline Irving’s “Investors Councils: Status report as of April 2003”, IMF, 
2003  
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associations, sector representatives, chambers of commerce, etc. then Competitiveness 
Partnerships will be able to gather and redirect that existing energy. The presence of 




•  Once the process has been initiated by the entrepreneurs, it will collapse if there is no 
political will to engage in dialogue. Therefore a  responsive government is key to the 
success or failure of Competitiveness Partnerships. Political will is likely to grow with 
time, as the benefits of engaging in dialogue with constituencies becomes evident to local 
politicians. It will, however, need to be jump-started in some cases by the sponsor. 
•  Capacity is key, as lack of capacity will result in failure of reform implementation. In 
countries with zero capacity in government,  Competitiveness Partnerships would be 
inappropriate, since entrepreneurs would be quickly disappointed by the fact that none of 
the reforms they propose are implementable.  
•  Lastly, government leadership is essential. Strong leadership from a strategic visionary 
head of the executive will often make up for other shortcomings, such as low capacity or 




•  The sponsor needs to be able to act as a middleman between the two first actors. 
Therefore the most important sponsor’s criteria is strong credibility with both actors. In the 
case of Bosnia, the High Representative played this role. In other countries the credibility 
could come from the fact that the sponsor represents an alternative to the existing or 
former system. The International Community could play this role through its agencies. A 
mentor country, such as France in some francophone African countries or the UK in the 
commonwealth, could also be a Competitiveness Partnership sponsor. In Central and 
Eastern Europe, the EC should also be able to play this role. Credibility comes often from 
either a “carrot” such as donations and loans to the government’s budget, or a “stick” 
such as the power to influence local politics or control foreign direct investments in a 
specific economy. But the sponsor can also be a well-respected personality by both the 
private sector and the government, such as in the case of the “Competitiveness Initiative” 
in Nigeria. 
•  An important condition that the sponsor needs to fill is to have the appropriate expertise. 
Indeed, bottom-up economic reforms need to be coordinated with framework efforts, and 
the sponsor needs to have the appropriate experts and contacts at hand to oversee the 
process at first. Only with that expertise will the sponsor be able to move the lobbying 
process forward. 
•  The sponsor needs to be able to  get media attention and  be complemented by 
instruments provided either by the sponsor or by others. These instruments can be 
logistical facilities,  seed funds  for starting the initiative until further funding becomes 
available, budget allocation from bilateral embassies, programmatic loans, etc..  
 
6-c Assessing Competitiveness Partnerships applicability 
 
The three actors, together with the instruments, can be mapped out for each context in order to 
start an assessment of the pertinence of Competitiveness Partnerships for a specific country. 
This exercise is not intended to be exhaustive. Rather it aims to provide a tool that will start a 
debate on the selection of the best possible reform process for a given case. 
 
Each of the four Competitiveness Partnerships dimensions is represented in the diagram below. 
For a given country, the sponsor, the public authorities, the private sector, and the availability of 
instruments are evaluated from weak to strong. By joining the four dots together, a polygon is 
obtained, which illustrates strengths and weaknesses of a specific context.   
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The weakness of one of the dimensions has to 
be counterbalanced by corresponding strength 
in at least one of the others for 
Competitiveness Partnerships to apply. If all 
four dimensions are weak, there is a poor 
chance of applicability. Two dimensions at the 
minimum need to be strong, as shown in the 
four examples below. 
 
In the Bosnian case, the Office of the High 
Representative was a strong sponsor, 
together with the IMF, the World Bank, USAID 
and the EC. Each of these organizations play 
a crucial role in the country, and counter-
balanced a weak political will and a low-
capacity government. Instruments were 
provided by the OHR (hosting of the Bulldozer 
Coordination Unit and seed funding) and by 
bilateral embassies (financing). 

























































Figure 12: Comp. Partnership in 
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In Turkey, the “Reform Program for the 
Improvement of the Investment Environment” 
is driven by a strong political will from the 
government and by a responsive and vibrant 
private sector. The World Bank serves as a 
partner rather than a sponsor. 
 
Launched in 2001, the process aims at 
changing the existing business environment in 
a comprehensive fashion
13. The government 
recognized early on that a productive 
collaboration between the public and the 
private sector was key in this process to 
ensure that policy reforms truly reflected and 
addressed private sector concerns. Intensive 
and direct involvement of companies and 
investors in this process has been realized 
through the Coordination Committee for the 
Improvement of the Investment Environment 
(CCIIE), which has been set up as a partnership between government bureaus and private sector 
representatives. Through 11 technical committees, it defines the reform program, executes it, and 
determines the business program calendar and final completion deadlines. Driven by a strong 
political will, this process ensures a firm linkage between the “micro” needs of the entrepreneurs 
and the “macro” policy of the government. The World Bank plays an important role as the reform 
program directly derives from the FIAS recommendations, thus ensuring a connection between 
diagnosis and implementation. By reaching out to the direct beneficiaries (the private sector) and 
involving the highest government officials, this government-driven Competitiveness Partnership 
overcame the absence of a constituent with a strong and clear mandate that could carry out 
effective investment promotion functions such as investor servicing, investment generation and 
policy advocacy.  
 
In Vietnam, the “Vietnam Business Forum” is now a well balanced process. The IFC and the 
World Bank have served as sponsors and have provided instruments such as technical 
assistance and hosting. The public 
authorities are responsive and the 
private sector is now well engaged in 
advocacy. 
 
Launched in 1998, the forum aim is to 
“improve the business environment, to 
stimulate economic development in 
Vietnam and to increase employment 
and improve people’s lives”
14. Entering 
its sixth year of operation, the Forum 
has succeeded in creating a  formal 
dialogue between the government and 
the private sector, both foreign and 
domestic. Its achievements in domains 
such as tax, licensing, labor and 
administrative reforms have derived 
from a strong partnership and direct 
                                                 
13 Information on the “Reform Program for the Improvement of the Investment Environment” is derived from presentations 
and reports issued in 2003 by the Coordination Council for the Improvement of the Investment Environment CCIIE and by 
Gokhan Akinci who coordinated the program for the World Bank. 
14 This quote and other information on the Vietnam Business Forum originate from the VBF activity report 2003, the VBF 
Website at www.vietnambusinessforum.org and the Socio-Economic Situation In 2003 and tasks for 2004, Government 
report, Presented by Deputy Prime Minister Nguyen Tan Dung at the Fourth Session of the Eleventh Vietnam National 




































Figure 13: Competitiveness 




































Figure 14: Competitiveness 
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linkage between four main parties that are the Vietnamese and international private sector, the 
donor countries, multilateral institutions such as the World Bank, who played the most important 
role as a facilitator, and the Vietnamese Government through the Ministry of Planning and 
Investment. It functions through an Executive Committee, composed of the IFC the World Bank, 
and private sector representatives. Business Groups and Working Groups tackle specific areas 
and make recommendations or provide assistance to the government for policy setting or specific 
reform targets.  
 
In  Nigeria, the “Better Business 
Initiative” functions in the context of a 
lack of political will and a dual-speed 
private sector (divided between 
struggling small enterprises and well-
off  financial and energy companies).  
 
Launched in 2002, its key factor was 
the sponsorship of a well-regarded 
academic that could bridge the trust 
divide between the government and 
the private sector
15. The World Bank, 
which was not in a position of 
sponsoring such an initiative due to a 
lack of confidence among the local 
population in international 
organizations, provided the necessary 
technical and financial support in the 
background. With the other donors (USAID and DFID), the Bank keeps a low profile while the 
Better Business Initiative is hosted by a local think-tank, the A frican Institute for Applied 
Economics. Five Working Groups are focusing on priority issues such as infrastructure, macro 
and trade policy instabilities, SME access to services, agriculture, legal and regulatory reform. 
Each Working Group is led by a local stakeholder, and a Steering Committee is comprised of 
sponsors, Working Group chairs and a senior Federal Representative. Only in its beginning 
stages, this initiative is supposed to deliver its first round of policy issues in October 2004 for 
discussion  with the government. But with a fragile equilibrium and only the goodwill of the 
sponsor to carry things through, the success of the Nigerian initiative will probably depend on the 
continuing availability of instruments such as funding, technical support a nd staffing from the 
World Bank and other donors. Indeed, it has already been observed that when the World Bank 
support declines, the initiative slows down, meaning that the initial sponsor does need to be 
complemented by strong instruments for the initiative really to succeed.  
 
6d- Potential applications 
 
Following this model, it appears that investment climate improvement derived from the Bulldozer 
or other similar Competitiveness Partnerships could be beneficial to transitional, low or middle 
income countries burdened by regulations and the heavy cost of doing business. If the business 
community is fairly organized, or ready to be organized, and if the government is disposed to 
listen to its concerns, then the process could be applied. Potential countries for this process might 
be the Democratic Republic of Congo, Azerbaijan, Guatemala, Cambodia or even Sierra Leone. 
Wealthier countries could benefit from such programs at the sub-national level. Such is the case 
in Mexico, where a targeted dialogue between the private sector and municipal officials could 
help reduce the high number of local formalities (“tramites”), while ensuring a better integration 
with Federal policies aimed at improving the regulatory environment. 
 
Because of its considerable contribution to the growth of civil society, the process could also have 
unique benefits for post-conflict countries in particular. A Competitiveness Partnership program 
                                                 
15 Information of the Nigeria Competitiveness Forum (renamed in February 2004 the “Better Business Initiative” sourced in 




































Figure 15: Competitiveness 
Partnership in NIGERIA   
 
Page 32 of 51 
could be designed for example in Afghanistan to bring previously repressed segments of society 
into the political culture by engaging them in the identification of administrative and economic 
reforms relevant to their daily lives. Through this process, small farmers and women could 
develop a sense of ownership and pride and increase their power as constituents.  
 
In Kosovo, the Bulldozer methodology is actually being applied since July 2004. The Kosovo 
Bulldozer Committee is sponsored by USAID and UNMIK and involves a dialogue between the 
Alliance of Kosovar Businesses and the Provisional Institutions of Self-Government, with an aim 
of identifying regulatory burdens that slow investment down and hinder business operations. This 
Competitiveness Partnership effort was launched as it was recognized that “not just economic 
growth but political stability”
16 depend on the success of such undertaking. 
 
In Iraq, appealing to small entrepreneurs for reforming administrative procedures and rewriting 
commercial rules and legislation could help in reconstruction of a legal framework. In addition to 
filling in the gaping holes in private sector regulation and boosting a business-oriented middle 
class, this process would provide much needed legitimacy, coming from the Iraqi private sector 
rather than from the immediate corporate interest of reconstruction contractors.  
 
In the Palestinian Authority, following decades of economic deprivation, a Competitiveness 
Partnership process – with, of course, a name other than Bulldozer – might provide an alternative 





The Bulldozer methodology, through its impact and its potential applications, could modify the 
way investment climate reforms are conducted in transitional economies.  
 
By being results-oriented, by promoting concrete, palpable results and by transforming the private 
sector into a real constituency for reform, Competitiveness Partnerships do more than just 
complement structural top-down approaches. They create a strong and lasting civic society that 
builds itself on the foundations of a new elite. In the case of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the 
Bulldozer turned the street entrepreneur into a new hero as well as an engine for growth and 
democracy.  
 
The insight derived from such Competitiveness Partnership provides a new and complementary 
path for development professionals. Together with government officials and private sector 
representatives, they now have access to a reform process that goes the last mile in improving a 
country’s investment climate – and eventually people’s lives. 
                                                 
16 Statement of Dale Pfeiffer, USAID Kosovo Mission Director, in July 1, 2004 press release.    
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PHASE I  
 
ROADBLOCK SUBMISSION FORM 
 
Submitted by 
Private Business  Government 




o > 100   employees*  o PRSP  o FIPA  o SEED  o W.B. 
o 50-100 employees*  o Entity*  o RDA*  o QIF  o E.C. 
o 20-50   employees*  o Canton*  X  Business Association*  o CHF  o US AID 
o 5-20     employees*  o Municip.*  o Association*  o UNDP  o I.M.F. 
o < 5       employees*  o Other*  o Other*  o Other*  o O.H.R. 
  
Submitter:    TALDI (Tuzla Agency for Local Development Initiatives) 
  Dr. Mevlida Kunosic-Vlajic, Direktor    
 
Reviewed and revised by:   Bulldozer Committee Working Group 
 
Roadblock title  R 01 Harmonization of LLC Minimum Capital Requirement 
 
Issue at stake: 
 
1.  Limited Liability Company (LLC) is the most popular form of business in Bosnia. One or 
more physical or legal persons can form a limited liability company by a founding act.   
-  In the Federation, the minimum statutory capital requirement is 2000 KM for a 
single proprietor and 10,000 KM if for an establishment with multiple partners.   
-  In R.S., the minimum statutory capital requirement is 5000 KM for all LLCs.   
-  In the Brcko District, the minimum statutory capital requirement is 5000 KM for 
all LLCs. 
 
2.  The statutory capital is divided between the founders, who each have a minimum share. 
This minimum share defines the maximum number of people that can start a company.  
-  In the Federation, the minimum share is 2000 KM (meaning that founders of a 
company are limited to 5 persons).  
-  In R.S., the minimum share is 500 KM (meaning that founders of a company 
are limited to 10 persons).  
-  In the Brcko District, the minimum share is 100 KM (meaning that founders of a 
company are limited to 50 persons).   
 
Why is this a roadblock? 
 
1.  Unfair advantage in FBiH for single proprietors, unfair advantage in RS/Brcko for multiple 
partners. 
2.  It may entice entrepreneurs to locate in the entity that presents the most advantage to them. 
3.  Harmonized fees are one step further towards a single economic space. Foreign 
investors generally refuse to deal with 3 different regulations for the same country.   
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4.  Single capital for both entities will facilitate the registration of a company in multiple 
entities. 
5.  It is too expensive. Lowering the investment will result in more people starting 
businesses. Additionally, lowering the cost of the minimum stake (share amount or price) 
will result in enabling small business to start with more partners (e.g. a small group could 
reach the proposed threshold of 2000 KM by having some individuals bring contributions 




Make the minimal statutory capital requirement 2000 KM in all cases (single proprietor or multiple 




Modify: Art. 314 in the Law on Business Companies (Federation); Art. 331 in the Law on 
Enterprises (R.S.), and Art. 343 in the Law on Enterprises (Brcko). (see Annex) 
 
 
FEDERATION OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA 
 
Law on Business Companies 






(1)  Statutory capital of limited liability company with several founders shall be no less 
than 10.000 (ten thousand) KM, and if there is only one founder 2.000 (two thousand) 
KM, unless otherwise provided by other laws.  
(2)  Value of an individual share may not be less than 2.000 (two thousand) KM. 
(3)  Contributions in money may not in total be less than the amount provided by 
paragraph 1. of this article. 
(4)  Contributions in items and rights shall be in total be invested in company until the day 
of submission of application for entry of company establishment into the court 
register, so that the company may permanently and freely dispose of them. 
(5)  Until the day of submission of application for entry of company establishment into the 
court registry at least half of the contribution in money shall be paid in, and it shall be 






(1)  Statutory capital of a limited liability company with one or several founders shall be 
no less than 2.000 (two thousand) KM, unless otherwise provided by other 
laws.  
(2)  Value of an individual share may not be less than 100 (one hundred) KM. 
(3)  Contributions in money may not in total be less than the amount provided by 
paragraph 1. of this article. 
(4)  Contributions in items and rights shall be in total be invested in company until the day 
of submission of application for entry of company establishment into the court 
register, so that the company may permanently and freely dispose of them. 
(5)  Until the day of submission of application for entry of company establishment into the 
court registry at least half of the contribution in money shall be paid in, and it shall be 
no less than the amount provided by paragraph 1 of this article.   
 





Law on Enterprises 





      
(1)  Statutory capital of a limited liability company may not be less than 5.000 Convertible Marks.  
(2)  A ready-money founding deposit of a particular member may not be less than 500 convertible 
marks in dinar countervalue according to the exchange rate on the day of purchase. 
 
Exceptionally from provisions of paragraph 2 of this article, if members of a limited liability 
company are entities who purchase preferred shares, in accordance with special regulations, a 






(1)  Statutory capital of a limited liability company may not be less than 2.000 Convertible 
Marks.  
(2)  A ready-money founding deposit of a particular member may not be less than 100 
convertible marks. 
 
Exceptionally from provisions of paragraph 2 of this article, if members of a limited liability 
company are entities who purchase preferred shares, in accordance with special regulations, a 





Law on Enterprises 






(1)  The capital stock shall amount to at least 5.000 KM, and each founding share amounting to 
at least 100 KM. The least amount of capital stock and the least amount of members’ 
founding share shall be paid prior to the entry in the Register. 
(2)  The capital stock may be funded with monetary contributions or contributions in things and 
rights. Contributions in things and rights shall be subject to the appropriate application of 
the provisions of Article 153 of this Law.  
(3)  Non-monetary contributions may consist of movable and immovable property, rights, and 
enterprises or parts of enterprises.  
(4)  Non-monetary contributions shall be delivered to the company in full prior to the notification 
for entry in the Register. If the value of a member's non-monetary contribution does not 
reach the value of his assumed founding share, the member shall pay the difference in 
money.  
(5)  The founding shares shall be delivered to the company in such a manner as allows the 
management to make free use of them. 
(6)  Monetary contributions shall be paid to the company's bank account.   
 






(1)  The capital stock shall amount t o at least 2.000 KM, and each founding share 
amounting to at least 100 KM. The least amount of capital stock and the least amount of 
members’ founding share shall be paid prior to the entry in the Register. 
(2)  The capital stock may be funded with monetary contributions or contributions in things 
and rights. Contributions in things and rights shall be subject to the appropriate 
application of the provisions of Article 153 of this Law.  
(3)  Non-monetary contributions may consist of movable and immovable property, rights, and 
enterprises or parts of enterprises.  
(4)  Non-monetary contributions shall be delivered to the company in full prior to the 
notification for entry in the Register. If the value of a member's non-monetary contribution 
does not reach the value of his a ssumed founding share, the member shall pay the 
difference in money.  
(5)  The founding shares shall be delivered to the company in such a manner as allows the 
management to make free use of them. 
(6)  Monetary contributions shall be paid to the company's bank account. 
   
 









ROADBLOCK SUBMISSION FORM 
 
Submitted by 
Private Business  Government 




o > 100   employees*  o PRSP  o FIPA  o SEED  o W.B. 
o 50-100 employees*  o Entity*  o RDA*  o QIF  o E.C. 
o 20-50   employees*  o Canton*  o Business Association*  o CHF  o US AID 
X 5-20     employees*  o Municip.*  o Association*  o UNDP  o I.M.F. 
o < 5       employees*  o Other*  o Other*  o Other*  o O.H.R. 
   
Submitter:  Rukotvorine, d.o.o.,  
 
Reviewed and revised by:        Bulldozer Committee Working Group 
 
Roadblock title  R 06 Removing mandatory fee for shelter in F BiH 
 
Issue at stake: 
 
Mandatory fees that companies have to pay for the construction of bomb shelters although such 
shelters often do not exist.   
 
Why is this a roadblock? 
 
The fee hinders investments in production facilities as it increases the construction costs by two 
percent.  For instance, to build a factory of 2000 m2, one has to pay 2% of the estimated 
construction value per every square meter.  This is approximately 2000 m2 x 800 KM x 2% = 
32.000 KM.  This amount is equal to the net annual salaries of 6 workers if they are to earn the 




Change Article 179 of the FBiH Law on Defense (Official Gazette F BiH n.15/96) to remove the 




FEDERATION OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA 
 
Law on Defense 




Article 179 (Unofficial Translation) 
 
“During the construction of buildings in cities and business centers and other inhabited places,   
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which, according to the assessments on dangers from war activities, could be the target of 
attacks in war, the investor is obliged, in accordance with the space or urban plan, to secure the 
construction of shelters or other protection facilities for people and material goods.   
 
Space or urban plan must include the measures for protection and rescue, the construction of 
new, and the adjustment of the existing shelters and other protection facilities for the protection 
and sheltering of people and material goods.   
 
Investors are responsible to build shelters in accordance with the plan from paragraph 2 of this 
Article, or pay a fee for the construction of public shelters to the Ministry of Defense in the amount 
of 2% of the total value of buildings– if the investor is not building his own shelter.   
 
Public administrator in charge of issuing a building permit, or a usage permit for a certain building, 
for which a shelter is to be built, cannot issue that permit if the conditions for the construction or 
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ROADBLOCK SUBMISSION FORM 
 
Submitted by: Sarajevo Region Bulldozer Committee 
 
Private Business  Government 




o > 100   employees*  o PRSP  o FIPA  o SEED  o W.B. 
o 50-100 employees*  o Entity*  o RDA*  o QIF  o E.C. 
o 20-50   employees*  o Canton*  o Business Association*  o CHF  o US AID 
X  5-20     employees*  o Municip.*  o Association*  o UNDP  o I.M.F. 
o < 5       employees*  o Other*  o Other*  o Other*  o O.H.R. 
   
 * Please precise:   VELUX BiH d.o.o.Sarajevo 
 
Contact person:   Tomas Chrastecky, VELUX BiH d.o.o. Sarajevo 
Contact information:   626-493/494  
 
Roadblock title  R05 Enabling business transactions through recognition of faxed 
orders as written documents 
 
Issue at stake: 
 
1-  When a buyer wants to purchase goods and/or services from a seller, the FBiH Law on 
Sales Tax Application to Products and Services (OG FBiH No.49/02) requires the buyer 
to issue a written purchase order. 
 
2-  In terms of the said Law, written orders sent via facsimile are not considered to be written 
orders by the Tax Authority.  
 
3-  The issue could be regulated by the FBiH Law on Obligation, but the FBiH Law on 
Obligation is silent on the issue whether a faxed document can be considered as a 
written document or not. 
 
4-  A university professor in his recent book on business transaction, on the basis of a 
number of court cases, infers that a faxed document is not a written document (Prof. Dr 
Mirko Vasiljevic, Ugovori u Privredi, Banja Luka 2002, page 3). 
 
5-  In RS, the RS Law on Sales and Excise Taxes in Republika Srpska (OG RS No.25/02 
and 30/02) indicates in article 66 among others that written documents are not a 
prerequisite to close a business transaction or enforce proper financial control by the 
authorities. Hence, in the RS, a Fax document can be used in the context of a purchase 
order, as the essence of the document is not an issue for the relevant RS Laws.   
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Why is this a roadblock? 
 
1-  An RS or a foreign buyer can fully process his orders through Facsimile. However, in the 
case that goods or services were purchased to an FBiH seller, the fax copy of the 
purchase order will not be sufficient for the FBiH seller, in order for him to comply with the 
relevant FBiH taxation obligations.  
 
2-  According to the legislation in force and its interpretation by the Tax Authority, the 
business friendly and safe process of ordering by fax is not good enough for the financial 
control / taxation purposes in the Federation. However, Fax transactions are recognized 
as bona-fide documents in all modern market economies. 
 
3-  Business transactions cannot be closed until sellers collect the original(s) buyer order(s). 
In real life, it translates into asking a customer to post each faxed order via regular post 
after a business case has been already closed (ordered, delivered, paid, invoiced). 
 
4-  If Bosnia based selling companies aim to sell all over the country (and even export), they 
deliver on the basis of thousands of orders per year. Urging customers to post additional 
document after a business transaction is actually closed to satisfaction of all involved, is 
an expensive and nonproductive activity that implies a significant technical burden for 
business.  
 
5-  A faxed document is mostly considered to be a written document on the global market. A 
faxed document, being a kind of hard copy itself, already displays all necessary elements 




Amend FBiH Law on Sales Tax Applicable to Products and Services (OG FBiH 49/02) with the 
view that a written document includes faxed document. 
 
Propose to the Working Group currently reforming Law on Obligations (a harmonized text for 
Federation of the Bosnia and Herzegovina and Republika Srpska) to determine faxed documents 




FEDERATION OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA 
 
 
LAW ON SALES TAX ON THE TURNOVER  
OF GOODS AND SERVICES 




Article 8  
 
Point 2)   that the products are sold based on a written order from the buyer for each single 
delivery, while issuing of an invoice is obligatory and the payment is not a cash form (payment 
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Suggested text: 
 
Article 8  
 
Point 2)   that the products are sold based on a written (including  faxed) order from the buyer 
for each single delivery, while issuing of an invoice is obligatory and the payment is not a cash 
form (payment order from the buyer’s bank account to the seller’s bank account, compensation, 
cession and the like). 
 
 
FEDERATION OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA and REPUBLIKA SRPSKA 
 
MIRROR  
LAW ON OBLIGATIONS 
DRAFT DATED 16 JUNE 2003 
 
Acceptance of immediate offer  
Article 38  
(Art 40 ZOO) 
 
An offer made to a person present shall be considered rejected if not accepted immediately, 
unless the circumstances of the case indicate that the offeree was entitled to a certain time 
for considering the offer. 
(2) An offer made by telephone, direct radio communication or video conference or equal means 
of communications shall be considered as offer made to a person who is present. 
 
 
A paragraph 3 should be added to this provision. It shall read: 
 
“An order made via fax shall be considered as an offer in writing” 
 
   
 








ROADBLOCK SUBMISSION FORM 
 
Submitted by: Central Bosnia Regional Bulldozer Committee 
 
Private Business  Government 




o > 100   employees*  o PRSP  o FIPA  o SEED  o W.B. 
o 50-100 employees*  o Entity*  o RDA*  o QIF  o E.C. 
o 20-50   employees*  o Canton*  X  Business Association*  o CHF  o US AID 
o 5-20     employees*  o Municip.*  o Association*  o UNDP  o I.M.F. 
o < 5       employees*  o Other*  o Other*  o Other*  o O.H.R. 
   
For RS:     
Contact person:   Stojan Prešic, STZR “PFC Presic” - Doboj 
Contact information:   053 241 352; 065 808 399  
 
For FBiH: 
Contact person:   Sead Nalic, engineer, Head of Department for Economy and  
Finance, Maglaj Municipality 
Contact information:   032 603 424 
 
Roadblock title  R34 Removing discrimination based on entity citizenship in the RS 
Law on Crafts and in the FBiH Law on Trade 
 
Issue at stake: 
 
1-  In RS, Article 14, paragraph 1, item 2 of the RS Craft Law (RS Official gazette No. 16/02), 
regulates that an entrepreneur can open a shop provided that he meets the listed 
conditions, and one of the requirements is that the entrepreneur  should be an «  RS 
citizen i.e. citizen of  Bosnia and Herzegovina ». 
 
2-  In FBiH, the FBiH Law on Trade (FBiH Official Gazette No. 2/95), in article 8b, paragraph 
1, item 1 of the Law on amendments to the Law on trade  (FBiH Official Gazette 19/96) 
regulates that « Permission for opening of a trade shop is issued to a person who meets 
the following requirements :  1)That he/she is citizen of BiH Federation and citizen of 
Bosnia and Herzegovina » 
 
Why is this a roadblock? 
 
1-  In RS, current situation in the Law on crafts leads to different interpretation of the word 
“i.e.” in the mentioned item and competent bodies often reject applications for opening of 
a shop from FBiH because the law defines that the founder has to be the RS citizen i.e. 
BiH citizen. Due to this provision, there is discrimination of FBiH citizens, and uniformity 
of BiH market is disturbed. In practice it limits the possibility to open a trade shop for 
citizens of FBiH, only because they do not have the RS citizenship.  
 
2-  In FBiH, this is a roadblock because it limits the possibility to open trade shops for RS 
citizens only because their place of residence is not in the Federation. Current situation in 
the Law on Trade puts the competent bodies into a situation where they cannot issue   
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decision on opening of a trade shop to RS citizens, because the law defines that the 
founder has to be FBiH citizen.  
 
3-  In both cases, the current legislation is a clear roadblock to a single economic space in 
BiH. Citizens from the other Entity are discriminated against. It disturbs the uniformity of 
the BiH market and it especially affects returnees in marginal areas of both entities.  A 
BiH citizen should be able to open his trade or craft legal entity wherever he or she 




1-  For RS : We propose amendments of the above-mentioned article in a way to delete the 
part of the text from item 2 of the above-mentioned article that reads: ‘’should be an RS 
citizen’’ so that the requirement will be limited to being a citizen of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina.  
 
2-  For FBiH : We propose amendments to the above-mentioned article in a way to modify 
item 1 of of the above-mentioned article that reads: ‘’that he is citizen of FBiH’’ into ‘’That 






-  Article 14, paragraph 1, item 2 of the RS Law on crafts (RS Official Gazette No. 16/02). 
-  FBiH Law on trade (FBiH Official Gazette No. 2/95), article 8b. paragraph 1, item 1 of the 





LAW ON CRAFTS 




Article 14.  
 
An entrepreneur can open a shop or have a craft business if he meets the following requirements:  
1. To be of age and capable for business,  
2. To be citizen of Republika Srpska i.e. citizen of Bosnia and Herzegovina,  
3. That a competent body did not prohibit him to perform this activity,  
4. That he is not a full time employee,  
5. That he meets general health requirements and special health requirements if defined so by 
the law for certain business,  
6. That he has the equipment i.e. means for work, staff and adequate premises, unless the nature 
of business i.e. work does not require that. 
 
Competent minister defines for which activities business premises are not required.  
 
If the law defines adequate level of education for certain business, apart from requirements in the 
previous paragraph, applicant is to submit proof of adequate level of education or to hire a person 




Article 14   
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An entrepreneur can open a shop or have a craft business if he meets the following requirements:  
1. To be of age and capable for business,  
2. To be citizen of Bosnia and Herzegovina,  
3. That a competent body did not prohibit him to perform this activity,  
4. That he is not a full time employee,  
5. That he meet general health requirements and special health requirements if defined so by the 
law for certain business,  
6. That he has the equipment i.e. means for work, staff and adequate premises, unless the nature 
of business i.e. work does not require that. 
 
Competent minister defines for which activities business premises are not required.  
 
If the law defines adequate level of education for certain business, apart from 
requirements in the previous paragraph, applicant is to submit proof of adequate level of 









In the Law on crafts (RS Official Gazette No. 16/02) in the article 14, paragraph 1, item 2 is to be 









No:                    Chair 
 
FEDERATION OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA 
 
LAW ON TRADE 




Article 8b  
 
Person who meets the following requirements will get permit for opening of a trade shop:  
1-  That he is citizen of the Federation and citizen of Bosnia and Herzegovina,  
2-  That he is capable to work,  
3-  That he meets health requirements if health is defined as a special requirement for retail 
trading with certain products in trade shops,  
4-  That he has business premises that meet general and special requirements,  
5-  That he does not work or already have a trade shop founded,  
6-  That he was not prohibited to work in this business by a legally effective decision on 
introducing a protective measure,   
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7-  That he settled all obligations for general social and common needs, and  






Person who meets the following requirements will get permit for opening of a trade shop:  
1-  That he is citizen of Bosnia and Herzegovina,  
2-  That he is capable to work,  
3-  That he meets health requirements if health is defined as a special requirement for retail 
trading of certain products in trade shops,  
4-  That he has business premises that meet general and special requirements,  
5-  That he does not work or already have a trade shop open,  
6-  That he was not prohibited to work in this business by a legally effective decision on 
introducing a protective measure, 
7-  That he settled all obligations for general social and common needs, and  







Based on chapter III. article 1 item d of FBiH Constitution (FBiH Official Gazette No.: 1/94, 13/97, 








In the Law on trade (FBiH Official Gazette No. 2/95, 19/96) article 8b, paragraph 1, item 1 is to be 








No. :                       
                                                                                                 Chair 
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ANNEX III: Quantifiable results for three different reforms of Bulldozer 






























Reform nº  


































!  Created more jobs 
!  Brought more tax revenue to authorities 
!  Freed up capital for investment 
!  Boosted exports 
!  Reduced administrative burden 
!  Reduced gray economy 









Harmonization of LLC minimum capital requirement 
Before the Bulldozer reforms there was a marked discrepancy between the 
minimum statutory capital requirements in the FBiH, RS and the Brcko District 
when registering a Limited Liability Company (d.o.o.), the most popular form of 
business in BiH. In the Federation, the minimum statutory capital requirement 
was 2,000 KM for a single proprietor and 10,000 KM for a company with 
multiple partners. In the RS and in Brcko District, the minimum statutory capital 
requirement was 5,000 KM for all LLCs. The minimum share also defined the 
maximum number of people wanting to participate in one company. In the 
Federation, the minimum share was 2,000 KM, which limited the founders of 
the company to five persons, in the RS, with a minimum share of 500 KM 
founders were limited to 10 persons and, in the Brcko District, with a minimum 
share of 100 KM up to 50 persons could be involved in the creation of a 
company. To consolidate the single economic space and prevent investors 
from having to deal with three different regulations in the same country, BiH 
harmonized this fee, and reduced the start-up cost in order to attract more 
people to start new businesses.  
The Palavric brothers are living proof that Bulldozer number 01 has worked. 
Nermin and Almir Palavric run a sanitary-paper production business that 
Nermin started when he was 18. Their business was originally registered as 
￿Extra￿, a home-based cottage industry (domaca radinost). As time went by, 
demand for their product grew and exceeded their supply capabilities by a 
factor of ten. Consequently, they resolved to expand their business. In order 
to secure bigger premises, purchase better machinery and employ more 
workers, they had to register their business as an LLC. Registering an LLC at 
the time would have required them to gather 10,000 KM. That was a very 
high threshold, that they could not reach that easily. When the Bulldozer 
reform number 01 was published in the Official Gazette, the Palavric brothers 
could finally afford to register their business as an LLC. 2000 KM are much 
more easy to gather than 10,000 KM, for such a small business: it is 8,000 
KM less! Once registered, they could invest in expanding their premises and 
buying better machinery. They even created a job for one additional person.  
The reform has harmonized and reduced LLC registration expenses 
throughout BiH (the Federation, the RS, and Brcko District), and by doing 
this it has contributed towards the consolidation of the single economic 
space. By lowering the financial threshold, it has enabled small businesses 
to start with more partners, and with less start-up capital. LOowering the 
barrier of entry for a company to operate unlocked capital from small 





￿We did not have enough revenues to gather
the 10,000 KM required under the old law to
register as a d.o.o. So we could not really
expand as a home based business. It was a
vicious circle. With the new law, requiring
2000KM only, we could register. We did, and
then could expand our business through
loans and investments ￿. 
WHY DID THE REFORM 
HELP YOU EXPAND 
YOUR BUSINESS?
Monthly increase of d.o.o. registration in 
Tuzla canton  since the Bulldozer reform. 
FBiH Official Gazette 30/06/03; 
Issue 29, Page 1375 
Average in Tuzla Canton: 
 
Before: 33 d.o.o. per month





 THERE WERE TWO BULLDOZER 
REFORMS ON THE BANKING  
SYSTEM. WE WERE SLOWED  
DOWN BY ADMINISTRATIVE  
       PROCEDURES TO INCREASE  
                OUR CAPITAL. 
WE WANTED TO INVEST MORE 
MONEY IN BOSNIA, BUT  
THE COUNTRY’S OWN ADMINIS- 
TRATION WAS SLOWING  
  US DOWN.. 
        WHEN THE REFORM  
     GOT IMPLEMENTED, WE  
   USED IT RIGHT AWAY, AND  
     INVESTED MORE IN THE  
COUNTRY.  IN TURN, OUR HEAD  
  OFFICE IN VIENNA DECIDED TO  
    LOWER THE INTEREST RATE  
       THAT ACCOUNT FOR THE  
      BUSINESS CLIMATE RISK. 



























































Reform nº  
THE ADVENTURES OF MAX
!  Created more jobs 
!  Brought more tax revenue to authorities 
!  Freed up capital for investment 
!  Boosted exports 
!  Reduced administrative burden 
!  Reduced gray economy 




Moving sales tax point of collection
Marinko Sulic 
General Manager 
Bobita Co. d.o.o. 
￿I would say that the effects have been very
beneficial to our firm since all of our business
is focused on the import and production of
alcoholic drinks ￿ an excisable product. Our
administration has become much more
streamlined and noticeably simpler and we
no longer have to fear if we are inadvertently
breaking the law every time we sell our
goods to a new customer, since our prices
are inclusive of tax. This has been a step in
the right direction.￿ 
 
How would you rate the 
impact on your business?
 
Average monthly increase in excisable tax 
revenue collection in RS since reform 
implementation as compared to previous year 
RS Official Gazette 23/07/03;  
Issue 60-II, Page 1, Item 637 
RS revenue collection: 
• 6.8 million KM / month before 
• 12.9 million KM / month after  
# 89% INCREASE 
 
Result:      
6,1 
Tax Administrations have been struggling to collect sales tax on 
excisable goods at the retail level ￿ the system has helped fictitious 
companies develop a complicated and almost untraceable chain of 
sales from one ￿wholesaler￿ to another. This has resulted in sub-
optimal collection of revenues for all levels of government in BiH. The 
concomitant overreaction by the BiH authorities has also meant that 
legitimate businesses have found it harder to conduct their regular 
operations. The Bulldozer Committee suggested changing the point of 
collection of the sales tax on excisable goods back to the import or 
production level. 
 
BOBITA CO. from Čitluk in Herzegovina has noted an improvement 
in business conditions since the reform began to be fully 
implemented for all excisable goods on August 1st 2003. The 
company￿s administrative requirements have become simpler, as it 
now settles its tax obligations immediately upon import or production 
of goods. This means that the company can sell goods to any 
wholesaler without exhaustive checks regarding the buyer￿s legal 
status, as the goods are sold with the tax already included in the 
price. This reduces the company￿s business risk since, according to 
the old system, it would have had to assume tax obligations for all 
goods sold to any rogue or fictitious companies.   
The smaller administrative burden has meant that BOBITA CO. can 
concentrate on importing and producing alcoholic beverages instead 
of undertaking various checks of their customers￿ corporate 
provenance. The new system has significantly reduced company 
paperwork; this is welcomed by businesses since it means lower 
operating costs. Retailers do not have to mingle with the tax on 
excisable items anymore. All the goods they buy are now tax 
included. In turn, the new system creates a fairer market from the 
consumer point of view, as pricing becomes consistent throughout 
one market. On its end, the governments of BiH is seeing benefits in 
terms of speedier and more efficient collection of revenues, as the 
new system has reduced opportunities for tax evasion. As a result, 
the governments need to spend less time and money on regulation 










1 2 3 4 5 
 SO YOU MEAN THAT THOSE TWO  
 REFORMS HELPED LOWER THE RATE.  
    AND THIS FOR EVERYBODY IN THE   
                  COUNTRY? 
     YES I DO,  
AND YOUR NEW  
MACHINE WILL BE  
THE PROOF OF JUST 
THAT.  HERE IS THE           I HAD ALREADY 
LOAN AGREEMENT.           PREPARED IT. 
BACK AT THE 
OFFICE… 
 
          I HAVE
           THE LOAN !! 
     I GOT IT  
    AT 11.5%! 
    MAX, YOU’RE 
 AMAZING! WE’RE   
 READY FOR LARGE 
CONTRACTS NOW! 





 WE NEED TO 
TURN IT A BIT 
THIS WAY.  GO AHEAD, 
I  AM  
HOLDING  
IT. 




























Reform nº  


































!  Created more jobs 
!  Brought more tax revenue to authorities 
!  Freed up capital for investment 
!  Boosted exports 
!  Reduced administrative burden 
!  Reduced gray economy 




Removing need for registration of 






Until the Bulldozer reform, it was impossible to register a foreign 
representative office for the whole territory of BiH with the state 
Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic Relations without registering 
in the Entities also. This was unnecessary in view of the fact that the 
activities of a representative office are limited to market research, 
advertising, public information, and identifying investment/market 
potential, as well as general representation.  
 
Judges and lawyers can now use shorter procedures to register a 
foreign representative office. However,  the reform is not that easy to 
use because the authorities did not simplify the corresponding by-
laws. For instance, health and pension benefits are still payable 
separately and employees who spend time at offices of the same 
company in the Entity other than the one in which they are registered 
for benefits run the danger of being refused medical treatment even 
though they work for a company that has received a permit to 
operate on the whole territory of BiH. Thus, more must be done to 
follow up on this reform.  
A foreign company wishing to set up a representative office is no 
longer required to fill out three sets of forms, to make a personal 
appearance at  three different locations or to pay three sets of fees.  
Since representative offices are often used as a first step by foreign 
investors, this reform will help attract foreign investment. Similarly, 
this whole exercise is one further step towards the consolidation of 
the Single Economic Space, something that is absolutely essential 




￿My company is already here. I know first
hand what it took to register. This reform will
really help companies that come to BiH in
the future. They will not have to put up with
the pointless inconvenience and expense of
having to register more than once like we
did.￿ 
What concrete benefits 
this reform brings to 
firms like yours?
Percentage reduction of administrative steps 
for obtaining the certificate of registration of 
a foreign representative office wishing to 
operate across BiH since the reform.
BiH Official Gazette 05/06/03;
Issue 15, Page 315, Item 150 
Number of personal 
appearances for registration:
 
Before: 9 in 3 Jurisdiction 




123   
THE CUTTING 
MACHINE IS SET 
UP. 
 
MAX, WE NEED TO DO A TEST 
RUN ON THIS MACHINE. 
 
WELL,  THAT’S  
THE PERFECT OCCASION TO  
DO THE PANELS I PROMISED  
SARAH’S FATHER FOR HIS  
COUNTRY HOUSE. 
THOSE PANELS WILL BE ANOTHER  
  CONCRETE PROOF THAT THE    
   BULLDOZER REFORMS  
  BROUGHT CONCRETE      
               RESULTS ! 
 
NOW
I JUST HAVE 
A PHONE CALL 
TO MAKE… 
HI. IT’S MAX. ARE YOU STILL 
INTERESTED IN THAT JOB? 
Page 49 of 51   
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ANNEX IV: Copy of the “Protocol for Prosperity”.   
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